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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays in applied econometrics. The rst two ex-
plore how students and parents respond to changes in educational policies. The last one
implements bias corrections for nonlinear panel data models with xed eects.
The rst essay addresses the eect of decreasing the age at which compulsory school-
ing begins in Mexico. A policy change in 2002 required all children between ages 3 and 5
to attend preschool before entering rst grade. School entry laws create a discontinuity
that induces a sharp increase in preschool enrollment at the expected birthday cuto. Us-
ing this sharp increase, I nd that requiring children to attend preschool increases their
achievement in elementary and middle school. There is also an increase in parental in-
vestments during elementary school. Only parents who would not send their kids to
preschool inuence the results, as access to preschool was free and universal prior to this
policy change.
The second essay uses an experiment in Mexican high schools to analyze how esti-
mates of peer eects change under dierent types of monetary incentives aimed at in-
creasing math achievement. I nd that the estimated peer eect diers between incen-
tivized and non-incentivized groups, and across incentivized groups. I argue that changes
in the impact of classroom peers’ ability (measured by their individual xed eects) result-
iv
ing from the experimental intervention should be interpreted as evidence of peer eects.
The third essay (with Ivan Fernandez-Val and Martin Weidner) develops two Stata
commands that provide bias-corrected estimates of panel probit and logit models with
two-way xed eects. Nonlinear panel data models with individual xed eects can be
severely biased because of the incidental parameter problem, and yet these models are
used in many empirical applications. The commands developed in this essay correct for
both the bias arising from the inclusion of individual xed eects and the additional bias
arising from the inclusion of time xed eects. They also provide corrected estimates of
the average partial eects.
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Chapter 1
The Eect of Compulsory Preschool on
Educational Outcomes and Parents’ Behavior:
Evidence from Mexico
1.1 Introduction
Understanding the interactions between schools and parents is essential to analyze the
inuence that parental inputs may have on child outcomes. Failing to account for poten-
tially unintended changes in parents’ optimal behavior not only can bias the eects of
many educational policies, but can also lead to the implementation of programs that do
not benet the students for which they were designed (or that do not benet such students
in the way expected). This is particularly true when studying the eects of early child-
hood education (ECE) programs, given that parental involvement is likely to be higher
when their children are very young.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the indirect eects that ECE programs
can have on children’s home environment in two ways. In the rst place, the analysis
below shows that being forced to send their kids to preschool induces parents to reallo-
cate both their own and their children’s time at home when they are potentially enrolled
in elementary school. More importantly, such reallocation is an indirect impact that is
mediated through the eect that preschool attendance might have on parent investment,
as children are less likely to do domestic housework and take care of other household
members, and their mothers are more likely to spend time studying with them. This is
1
2an indirect eect because it is not observed at the time when children are forced to go to
preschool, which will naturally aect their time use. The reallocation of time is observed
when children are enrolled in elementary school, which is a period when the household
constraint is unchanged because all children from the appropriate age were already at-
tending this education level.
Secondly, my results suggest that despite the fact that children from more disadvan-
taged families are more likely to attend preschool when their parents are forced to send
them to school, it is among children from more advantaged families that an increase in
parental eort −as measured by time reallocation− is observed. This result is in line with
two very recent studies showing that parental investments are compensatory in response
to negative shocks (Fu and Mehta, forthcoming; Bharadwaj, Eberhard, and Neilson, forth-
coming). Examination of the eect of preschool attendance on educational achievement
shows that students are less likely to repeat a grade in elementary school and, in con-
sequence, they accumulate more years of education up to middle school. Because being
forced to send their kids to preschool has a stronger eect among disadvantaged children,
it must be true that students are more likely to attend school with a disadvantaged peer
both during and after preschool. In response, parents from more advantaged households
might perceive the need to compensate for the lower quality of peers at school, which can
explain why it is among these households that there is a reallocation of time.
Unless randomized, studying the eects of preschool attendance (both direct and indi-
rect) faces multiple challenges given the parents’ endogenous decision of whether to send
their children to school or not. In this study I use an exogenous variation in compulsory
education laws in Mexico that made preschool mandatory. The new compulsory educa-
tion laws, in combination with the age requirements to be eligible to attend preschool,
imply that children who were born after September 1 of 1998 must have at least one year
of formal education before they enter 1st grade. Because day of birth determines whether
3parents must send their kids to school, it can be used as an instrument for the endoge-
nous decision of preschool attendance. This exogenous change provides an ideal setting
because manipulation of the instrument is very unlikely as the change in compulsory ed-
ucation laws aected children who were already born. The reduced forms and the rst
stage regressions are implemented using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. As dis-
cussed in Section 4, the reduced forms and the rst stage come from two dierent datasets
that cannot be linked at the individual level. This does not impose particular challenges
for the estimation, except for the computation of the standard errors, which I compute
using Inoue and Solon (2010).
As is standard in empirical studies that use a RD design, I rst show that preschool
attendance is strongly correlated with day of birth. The probability that a student aected
by the new compulsory education laws completes at least one year of preschool before
entering 1st grade increases on average 20 percentage points, from 70% to 90%. All other
requirements necessary for identication can be veried in the data. Additionally, chil-
dren from more disadvantaged families −as measured by household income and mother’s
education− experience a higher impact from the policy because they were less likely to
attend preschool previous to the reform.
Having established the increase in preschool attendance from the exogenous variation
in compulsory education laws, I show that having at least one year of formal education
before entering 1st grade reduces the likelihood that students repeat a grade in elementary
school, and they also accumulate more years of education up to middle school, which
implies they remain in school longer. The important implication that arises from this
result is that, given the reform had its stronger eects on preschool attendance among
disadvantaged children, it must be true that any given student is more likely to attend
school with a disadvantaged peer both during and after preschool.
Although having at least one year of preschool improves educational achievement in
4elementary and middle school, it does not improve students’ level of cognitive ability. This
result might be discouraging, especially if the Mexican government’s objective was to in-
crease school readiness, but is in line with previous ndings of ECE programs. Several
studies have documented how short-term gains in cognitive outcomes tend to “fade out”
fairly quickly, and yet early interventions are still positively correlated with measures of
scholastic success (see Currie 2001 and Currie and Almond 2011 for a review). There is
suggestive evidence that this relationship between early childhood education and later
children’s outcomes can be partially explained by improvements in non-cognitive skills
(e.g. Chetty, Friedman, Hilger, Saez, Schanzenbach, and Yagan 2011), although some stud-
ies have also found potential negative impacts in this type of measures (Baker, Gruber,
and Milligan, 2015; Lipsey, Farran, and Hofer, 2015a). Whereas I cannot analyze the eect
of preschool on non-cognitive outcomes, the conclusion that can be drawn from these
studies is that cognitive ability is not the sole determinant of children’s success at school.
The data used in this study allows me to analyze another very plausible channel
through which improvements in educational achievement might arise, changes in parents’
behavior. Looking at the indirect eect that preschool attendance might have on parents’
behavior is not only a matter of data availability, but is also motivated by previous stud-
ies showing that high quality preschool education increases parental involvement among
lower income families (Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2013; Gelber and Isen, 2013). To be more
precise, the paper by Gelber and Isen (2013) looks in fact at a direct eect of preschool
education, as they analyze data from the Head Start Impact Study, which includes an ex-
plicit component aimed to increase parental involvement with their children. Cascio and
Schanzenbach (2013) on the other side, analyze the eect of universal preschool on the
time mothers spend with their children at the moment of the intervention (and in par-
ticular when they are 4 years old), while this study looks at the eect on time use post
preschool.
5My results suggest that parents respond to having to send their kids to preschool
by reallocating both their own and their children’s time at home when they are poten-
tially enrolled in elementary school. This reallocation of time is important because of
two reasons. First, it arises in one activity that is directly related to the level of parental
investment or parental eort, which is the time mothers spend studying with their chil-
dren. Second, it also arises in activities that parents must be assigning to their children,
as opposed to activities that children themselves feel motivated to do, which are doing
domestic housework and taking care of other households members.
Although I cannot directly investigate why parents modify their behavior, the ob-
served changes in the allocation of time, together with the stronger eect on preschool
enrollment for disadvantaged children, can be used to analyze the type of households
where parental investment is changing. On one side, the reform can make disadvantaged
households aware of the value of education, motivating parents to invest more in their
children. It is also possible that the reform forces these households to invest in education
earlier that expected, and so parents in these homes can try to reinforce their investment
by increasing involvement with their children. On the other side, children are on average
more likely to attend school with a disadvantaged child both during and after preschool.
In this case, parents from more advantaged households might be the ones who increase
involvement with their children if they perceive a need to compensate at home for the
lower quality of peers at school.
My last sets of results show that, on average, the reform had its stronger impacts on
parents’ behavior among more advantaged households with high levels of income and
high levels of parental education, even though the same reform had its stronger eects
on preschool enrollment among children of more disadvantaged households. Although
alternative explanations are possible, this is very suggestive evidence that parental in-
vestments might be compensatory with regard to quality of education, and is also in line
6with recent studies showing parents react in an opposite direction to changes in school
resources: increased resources at school (e.g. higher quality peers) leads to a decrease in
parental eort, while a decrease in school resources leads to an increase in parental eort.
1.2 Early Childhood Education and Care in Mexico
According to the OECD, about 12 million children aged ve and younger live in Mexico
(OECD, 2017). Families with very young children (aged three and under) can send their
kids to daycare, while children between three and ve years old are expected to attend
preschool. Although there is some overlap for three year-olds, less than 10% of children
between zero and two years old were enrolled in daycare in 2013. The main provider
of early childhood education is the Mexican Secretariat of Education (SEP) through the
preschool system.
1.2.1 Preschool Education System and Change in Compulsory Education Laws
The preschool education system in Mexico is targeted to children between three and ve
years old, who can potentially attend this level for three years. Three year-olds are sup-
posed to attend the rst year of preschool, four year-olds are supposed to attend the sec-
ond year of preschool, and ve year-olds are supposed to attend the third and last year of
preschool. Since 1991 most preschool centers were administered by the federal govern-
ment, leaving less than 10% of the supply to private schools. All preschool centers oer
the rst, second and third year of preschool. For simplicity, I refer to academic years by
the year in which the spring term occurs, e.g. the academic year 2004-2005 is 2005.
Preschool attendance was not a requirement to enter 1st grade, and children of the
relevant age could attend preschool at any time; that is, parents could enroll their children
in preschool since they were three years old, but they could also enroll their children until
they were ve years old, or choose not to enroll them in this education level at all. Since
71995 most ve year-olds would attend the last year of preschool, but enrollment rates for
four year-olds were relatively low (around 50%), and even more so for three year-olds.
On November 12 of 2002 the Mexican government announced that preschool will
become part of compulsory education. The government’s rationale to make preschool
mandatory was the belief that there were enough spaces available for all children of three
to ve years old to attend this educational level, but yet enrollment rates were far from
universal, especially for three and four year-olds. Given the low enrollment rates in the
rst year of preschool, the reform was phased-in as follows:
1. All ve year-olds must be enrolled in the third year of preschool in 2005,
2. All four and ve year-olds must be enrolled in the second and third year of preschool,
respectively, in 2006; and
3. All three, four and ve year-olds must be enrolled in the rst, second and third year
of preschool, respectively, in 2009.
Although the reform implied that the government was responsible for providing universal
access to preschool education, no plan was announced regarding the construction of new
schools or hiring additional teachers. The new compulsory education laws also implied
that parents were responsible for enrolling their children in preschool according to the
phase-in of the reform, and elementary schools were not allowed to enroll children in 1st
grade if they did not have proof of preschool attendance.
Enrollment rates in 1st grade were close to 100% previous to the introduction of the
policy, and they remained at this level afterwards. This suggests that, in practice, elemen-
tary schools continued enrolling all eligible children irrespective of whether they attended
preschool or not. There was, nevertheless, a substantial increase in the proportion of three
to ve year-olds who enrolled in preschool. Figure 1 presents the enrollment rates in this
8education level between 1991 and 2014 using the number of enrolled children at the end
of each academic year as reported by the Mexican Secretariat of Education (SEP). Panel A
displays enrollment rates for ve year-olds, while Panels B, C and D present the enroll-
ment rates for four, three and three to ve year-olds, respectively. The solid vertical line
indicates the time when enrollment rates should to be close to 100%. It is worth noticing
that enrollment pre-reform varied signicantly among age groups, and so the scale of the
y-axis in each panel is dierent to better observe changes over time.
The highest enrollment rate pre-reform can be observed in Panel A, where 80% of ve
year-olds were attending preschool. For this age group, enrollment started increasing at
a faster rate after the reform and reached its peak at 95% in 2007, but started decreasing
the year after and has remained at about 85% since 2010. This decrease in enrollment
has its source in a second policy change that aected ve year-olds: on June 20, 2006, the
Mexican government also announced that the age requirement to enroll in 1st grade would
be reduced from six years old by September 1 of 2006, to six years old by December 31 of
the same year. This means students can be ve years and eight months by the time they
begin elementary school. The rst decrease in enrollment is observed until 2008 because
children who expected to begin 1st grade in 2007 should had applied for enrollment in
February of 2006, previous to the announcement of the new age requirement policy.
Although of interest in its own right, this second policy change will not be evaluated in
this study. It is also not a concern regarding its eects on the outcome variables here stud-
ied given that, as I will explain in the next section, the analysis of the eect of preschool
attendance on children’s later outcomes is based on a denition of the treatment variable
that does not overlap with this second policy change. Additionally, the new age require-
ment for 1st graders implies that about one third of ve year-olds should be enrolled in
this level since 2008, and so the fact that 85% of ve year-olds are attending preschool
suggests not only that enrollment rates in this age group are close to 100%, but also that
9a large fraction of those eligible for 1st grade are attending preschool instead.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the highest increase in enrollment was for four year-
olds. Although preschool became mandatory for this age group until 2006, enrollment
started increasing since the rst year of the reform in 2005, and continued this pattern to
reach the largest coverage among preschool age children, 90%. The least aected group
are three year-olds, where no signicant increase associated with the reform is observed.
As it can be inferred from Panel C, the enrollment rate in preschool for three year-olds
has been steadily increasing since 1991, but is far below the rates for four and ve year-
olds. In fact, as it became evident that the enrollment rate was not increasing at a big
enough pace to reach 100% by 2009, the government relaxed the last phase of the reform
and postponed the enforcement of the rst year of preschool as a prerequisite to enter 1st
grade.
1.3 Data
I use information from three nationally representative databases: a panel survey and two
dierent repeated cross-sections. Information on the outcome variables comes from the
panel survey and one of the cross-sections, while individual data on preschool attendance
is taken from the second cross-section. One important aspect of my analysis is that I
cannot link individual data for any of the databases, which means my estimation of the
eect of early education on student’s and parents’ outcomes will make use of two dierent
samples. As I explain in the next section, this determines my choice of the identication
strategy.
1.3.1 Preschool Attendance Data
I obtain information on whether a student attended preschool from the Encuesta Nacional
de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, ENIGH (Mexican Income and Expenditure Household
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Survey). The ENIGH is a nationally representative cross-section household survey that it
has been collected every two years since 1992 (except in 2005 when a special collection
was made), and their main purpose is understand the dynamics of income and expenditure
of Mexican families. However, information on some educational variables relevant for this
study is available from 1996. The ENIGH is collected in the last trimester of each survey
year, when the academic year has already begun. This means the ENIGH of 2002, for ex-
ample, contains information for the beginning of the academic year 2002-2003. Preschool
attendance is dened as follows.
Preschool Attendance. For children 5 years and older, the ENIGH reports whether they
completed the grade that precedes 1st grade. Unfortunately, I cannot observe how many
years of preschool these children have, but only if they did not attend this level at all.
Hence, preschool attendance, which may be thought of as the potential treatment, is an
indicator variable equal one if a student currently enrolled in 1st grade completed the
previous grade, and equal zero otherwise. In consequence, the eect of the treatment on
the outcome variables (dened below) can be interpreted as the eect of having attended
preschool for at least one year.
As I mentioned above, a second policy change aected preschool age children, and in
particular ve year-olds: in 2006 the government decreased the age requirement to enroll
in 1st grade from six years old by September 1, to six years old by December 31. Given I
observe preschool attendance by the time a student is already in 1st grade, the eect of
the treatment can still be interpreted as the result of having at least one year of preschool.
Again, I do not observe how many years a student went to preschool, but I do observe if
she did not attend this level at all.
Of course, a student who attended preschool when she was 4 and began 1st grade
when she was 5 can be very dierent from one who attended preschool when she was 5
and began 1st grade when she was 6. This might be particularly true for those who unex-
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pectedly found themselves able to enroll in 1st grade and chose to do it. Panel A of Figure
1 shows that the rst decrease in preschool enrollment for ve year-olds happened in 2008
as those planning to attend 1st grade in 2007 were already enrolled in this grade before
this second policy change. Hence, the rst cohort aected by the new age requirements
are children born between September 1 and December 31, 2001. I show in the Appendix
that my results do not change if I exclude this group of children from the analysis.
1.3.2 Outcome Variables I
The main outcome variables come from two dierent household surveys. The rst one is
the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a panel data collected in three dierent rounds,
one in 2002, one between 2005 and 2007, and the last one between 2009 and 20131. The
original sample includes 35,000 individuals, from whom 90% were reinterviewed in the
second and third rounds of the survey. The survey collects a wide range of socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics, including school attendance, last grade completed, if and
how many times a student repeated a grade, school interruptions and school characteris-
tics. Students’ characteristics and outcomes are dened as follows.
Demographics. The survey contains information on age, gender, dwelling character-
istics, household assets, and, more importantly, exact birth date. Because the preschool
reform studied here has a direct eect on children born after a certain date, having infor-
mation on exact birth date allows the identication of the subgroup aected by the reform.
The data also includes parental variables such as education, employment, migration and
income.
Grade retention. My measure of performance in elementary school from this survey is
whether a student repeated any grade between 1st and 4th grade. The choice of 4th grade
1Ocially, the second and third rounds of the MxFLS were conducted between 2005-2006 and 2009-2012.
However, variables that report the last year when an interview was made indicate that some households
were interviewed in 2007 and 2013.
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as the upper bound relies in data availability. The last round of the MxFLS was conducted
between 2009 and 2013, but more than 90% of the individuals were interviewed in the
academic years 2009 and 2010. The rst cohort aected by the reform entered 1st grade in
2006 and, assuming no grade is repeated, should be in 5th grade in 2010 (or have completed
4th grade by 2010). Because retention in 5th grade can be observed only after students
have studied 5th grade at least once, I can only observe retention up to 4th grade. Hence,
retention in grade k , k = 1, . . . , 4, is an indicator variable equal one if, conditional on
having completed grade k − 1, a student repeated grade k one or more times.
Cognitive ability. The MxFLS includes answers of interviewed individuals to Raven’s
Progressive Matrices, aimed to measure the cognitive state at the time of the interview.
Two dierent set of matrices are applied, one for household members 12 years old or
younger, and one for household members older than 12. For children 12 years or younger,
I construct the proportion of correct answers and then norm the results such that, within
age, the proportion of correct answers has mean zero and standard deviation one pre-
reform.
Children’s time allocation. Information on the way children allocate their time among
dierent activities is also reported in the survey. Time allocation is actually intended to
measure how children use their time outside the school, and the activities reported include
attending a non-formal educational center, watching tv, doing domestic housework, read-
ing, and hours of sleep. A full list of the activities reported in the survey is provided in the
Appendix. Time allocation is analyzed in two ways, using indicator variables for whether
children spent some time in each activity (extensive margin) and the number of hours
they spent in each activity (intensive margin). As with cognitive ability, these variables
are normed such that, within age, time allocation has mean zero and standard deviation
one pre-reform.
13
Parent’s time allocation. Adults inside the household are also questioned about the way
they allocate their time. The set of activities reported is almost the same as of children. I
measure time allocation separately for mothers and fathers, and normalize the variables
in the same fashion as cognitive ability and children’s time allocation.
1.3.3 Outcome Variables II
To overcome the fact that children performance in elementary school can be observed only
up to 4th grade in the MxFLS, I use a third database, the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion
y Empleo, ENOE (Mexican Employment Survey). The ENOE is a nationally representa-
tive survey collected every three months since the rst trimester of 2005 and up to the
last trimester of 2016. The survey contains very detailed information about the employ-
ment of Mexican families, and each individual is interviewed ve times such that very
short-run changes in employment status can be observed. The survey also includes some
educational variables such as school attendance and last level of education achieved.
Although preschool attendance can be observed in the survey, the rst round was
collected by the time the rst phase of the reform was already in place. However, for
children who were already in elementary and middle school there is information for at
least one year pre-reform. For example, children who should be second graders in the rst
round of the ENOE (which corresponds to the academic year 2006) must have completed
rst grade in or before 2005, and so there is one year of data pre-reform. In a similar way,
children who should be third graders in the rst round of the ENOE must have completed
second grade in or before 2005, and so there are two years of data pre-reform. The survey
does not contain information about grade retention, but the outcome variable I use from
this survey is dened as follows.
Appropriate grade for the age. To observe the last level of education achieved, I use
only information reported in the fth interview. Based on their birth date, I determine
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how many years of education a child must have by the time of the interview. A student
is in the appropriate grade for her age if the last level of education achieved is higher or
equal to the education level she should have.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Estimating the eect of preschool attendance on children’s outcomes faces multiple chal-
lenges because parents’ choice of whether to send their kids to preschool or not is en-
dogenous. For that reason, children from disadvantaged families are usually the target of
preschool programs, as they are less likely to have access to early childhood education.
The change in compulsory education laws in Mexico provides a plausible random varia-
tion that inuenced the parents’ decision of sending their kids to school. Given the new
laws and the age requirements to be eligible for preschool, the reform has the following
implications:
1. Children born after September 1, 1998, must have completed the third year of preschool,
and in consequence have at least one year of formal education before entering 1st
grade.
2. Children born after September 1, 2000, must have completed the second and third
year of preschool, and have at least two years of formal education before entering
1st grade2.
As explained in Section 3.1, the preschool attendance data used in this study does not
allow me to separate the eect of having one year versus two years of preschool; instead,
I can only observe if a student completed the grade previous to 1st grade. In consequence,
2 In theory, children born after December 31, 2004, must have completed the rst, second and third year
of preschool, and in consequence have at least three years of formal education before entering 1st grade.
However, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the last phase of the reform has been postponed, and I do not include
this as a consequence of the new compulsory education laws.
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I instrument the endogenous decision of attending preschool with an indicator variable
for whether a child was born after September 1, 1998, such that the eect of preschool
attendance can be interpreted as the eect of having at least one year of formal education
previous to enrollment in elementary school. The rst-stage takes the following form:
yibs = α1Dib + α2Dist01Sep1998 + α3Dib fp(Dist01Sep1998) + βXib + λs + ϵibs (1.1)
whereyibs is an indicator variable equal one if student i born in date b in state s completed
the grade previous to rst grade, and Dib is an indicator variable equal one if a child was
born after September 1, 1998. Dist01Sep1998 is the distance, in days, between the day a
student was born and September 1, 1998, and fp(Dist01Sep1998) is an RD polynomial in
distance to September 1, 1998, estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Xib is a
vector of student and parents characteristics, and λs is a state xed eect.
The reduced-form regressions take the same form as Equation (1), except that yibs is
an outcome variable for student i born in date b in state s . However, as I mentioned at the
beginning of Section 3, I use two dierent databases for the rst-stage and the reduced-
forms, which cannot be linked at the student level. Hence, my estimation of the eect of
preschool attendance on student outcomes is an instrumental variable estimator that uses
moments from two dierent samples. Because there is only one endogenous regressor and
one instrument, the model is exactly identied. The parameter of interest in Equation (1)
is α1, and so if α̂11 is the coecient on Dib from the rst-stage and α̂21 is the coecient on
Dib from the reduced-form, the two-sample instrumental variable estimator is given by
α̂ IV1 =
α̂21
α̂11
(1.2)
The parameter α̂ IV1 represents a local average treatment eect of the impact of preschool
attendance for children who would have not attended this education level in absence of
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the reform. Children from families that would have send their kids to preschool regardless
should not inuence the estimates.
The results presented section 5 use dierent bandwidths for the distance between birth
date and September 1, 1998. Based on the graphical evidence and the RD regressions in
that section, I will limit my analysis of the causal eects of preschool attendance to the
sample of children within two years below and above the birth date cuto, as this seems
to be the smallest bandwidth that still gives reasonable precision and provides sensible
results. All the results in section 6 will make use of a 2-year bandwidth.
Identication requires: (1) all other factors other than the treatment variable vary
continuously at the birth date threshold, (2) preschool attendance is strongly correlated
with date of birth, and (3) birth date only aects outcomes through its eect on attending
preschool. As noticed in Figure 1, it is very likely that preschool attendance is highly cor-
related with date of birth (especially for four year-olds), as parents do not choose voluntar-
ily whether to send their kids to preschool, but instead are forced to do so. Nevertheless,
I test all these assumptions in the next section.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 First Stage
I begin by visually examining whether being in 1st grade in an academic year aected by
the reform has an eect on completing the previous grade. As previously explained, the
treatment variable is dened as an indicator variable equal one if a student completed the
grade previous to 1st grade. Hence, students who were in 1st grade in 2005 and above
(born after September 1, 1998) should be more likely to be treated relative to students
who were in 1st grade in 2004 and below. Figure 2 uses a local linear polynomial to plot
the treatment against the day a student was born. Dashed lines represent 95% condence
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intervals. The gure shows that the probability of completing the grade previous to 1st
grade increases discontinuously at the threshold, indicating that date of birth was an im-
portant determinant of preschool attendance. As Figure 2 shows the eect of the reform
was strong, increasing the probability of completing one year of preschool in about 20
percentage points.
Next I examine whether the density of the running variable, i.e. birth date, changes
discontinuously at the threshold. One way in which there could be sorting around the
threshold is if parents change their decision about whether and when to have a child, but
given the new compulsory education laws aected children who were already born such
sorting seems particularly unlikely. Panel A of Figure 3 plots the density of birth date in
40-days intervals. The density of the running variable seems to be smooth around the
threshold, and an implementation of the test proposed by McCrary (2008) conrms that
this is the case.
A second approach to test the validity of RD estimates is to examine if pre-determined
characteristics vary discontinuously at the birth date threshold. There are many ways in
which being forced to attend preschool can aect both children and their parents. How-
ever, I can test whether some demographic characteristics that are very unlikely to be
aected by the reform show a discontinuous jump at the threshold. Panels B to H of Fig-
ure 3 show RD graphs for student’s gender, whether a student speaks Spanish, whether
a student speaks an indigenous language, father’s age, father’s age when he began 1st
grade, mother’s age, and mother’s age when she began rst grade, respectively. All these
panels show that pre-determined characteristics are smooth around the threshold except
for student’s gender, where a positive jump in the proportion of males can be observed
immediately to the right of the cuto.
Table 1 uses the pre-determined characteristics of Figure 3 as the dependent variable
in Equation (1) for dierent bandwidths around the birth date threshold. The table re-
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ports the coecient on Dib from Equation (1). In line with the graphical evidence, most
coecients in Table 1 are very small in magnitude and statistically insignicant, with the
only exception of student’s gender. The coecient on Dib for the proportion of males
is relatively high and statistically signicant when I use a 3-year bandwidth in Column
(2), and relatively high but statistically insignicant for all the other bandwidths. One
possible explanation is that parents might be more likely to send their male children to
school if, for example, they perceive the returns to education to be higher for males than
for females. However, given I do not observe the same pattern for all bandwidths, it is
also possible that this statistically signicant dierence arises due to sampling error.
Finally, Panel A of Table 2 presents the rst stage results for the probability of com-
pleting the grade previous to the rst grade using the RD specication from Equation (1).
As suggested by Figure 2, the eect of the policy is very strong, increasing the probability
of completing at least one year of preschool by 20 percentage points, relative to a sample
average of 70%.
1.5.2 Who was Aected by the New Compulsory Education Laws?
There are some key dierences between the policy change here studied and other early
childhood education programs. On one side, small scale interventions like Head Start or
The Perry School Project are primarily targeted to preschool age children from disadvan-
taged families. These programs are focused on providing quality preschool education, and
they also include a parental component aimed to improve children’s home environment.
An important number of previous evaluations have shown that these programs are eec-
tive in improving children’s educational outcomes, and more recent papers estimate that
there is also an increase in parental involvement. Both set of outcomes provide some ev-
idence that high quality preschool education for poor children matters, and their parents
are willing to support them at home if they are taught how to do so.
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On the other side, universal pre-K programs like the ones implemented in Georgia
and Oklahoma have a broader impact as they make access available to children from all
backgrounds, but one of their main features is that they are voluntary. In that sense, there
is a potential for selection bias, as parents who choose to enroll their children in pre-K
could be the ones who perceive a high return from education. Although evaluations of
universal pre-K programs use dierent strategies to overcome this selection bias, it is still
parents’ choice whether to send their kids to pre-K or not.
The policy change in Mexico not only established government’s responsibility of of-
fering preschool universally, but it made this level part of compulsory education. The
rationale behind the government’s decision was the belief that there were enough spaces
available for all preschool age children, but yet not all of them were enrolled. In fact, pre-
vious to the reform, 92% of preschool education was supplied through free public schools.
Given this particular context, it is not obvious who are the kids most aected by the re-
form.
The results in Table 2 also present estimates of the rst stage by household income
level (Panel B) and parents’ educational attainment (Panels C and D). As it can be observed
in Panel B, previous to the reform the lowest percent of students who completed the grade
previous to rst grade was among the poorest households, and the highest percent among
the wealthier households. In contrast, the eect of the reform was the highest among the
poorest households, and the lowest among the wealthier households. It is worth noticing,
however, that the reform had about the same very strong eect for all households in
the rst three quintiles of the income distribution, and the eect among households in
quintiles four and ve, although smaller, it is also quite high.
Similar patterns are observed for parents with dierent levels of educational attain-
ment. The lowest percent of students who completed the grade previous to rst grade
was among children whose parents have no education, while the highest percent was
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among children whose parents completed middle school (Panels C and D)3. The reform
had the same eect among all levels of fathers educational attainment, but the eect is
the strongest for mothers with no schooling. Again, although the eect is smaller among
mothers with the highest level of education included in Panel D of Table 2, the estimated
coecient is still very high.
The evidence from Table 2 suggests that the reform had its stronger eect (in terms of
preschool enrollment) among the more disadvantaged households with low income and
low levels of parental education, but at the same time it does not seem to be the case that
the wealthier more educated households were disproportionately less aected. In fact, the
eect of the policy among households in the top two quintiles of the income distribution
is about two thirds of the eect for the households at the bottom, the eect is the same
across all levels of fathers’ education, while the eect for the highest level of education
observed for mothers is also about two thirds of the eect among mothers with no formal
education.
In terms of income and mothers’ education the policy seems to bring preschool enroll-
ment to about the same level. Enrollment rates reached 93% for households in quintile I,
96% for households in quintile II, and 97% for households in quintiles III, IV and V. Similar
patterns are observed for mother’s education: enrollment rates reached 94% in house-
holds where the mother has no education, 91% in households where mothers have less
than 6 years of education, 98% for mothers who completed elementary school, and 99%
for mothers who completed middle school. More pronounced dierences are observed in
terms of father’s education. Although the policy had on average the same eect among
all levels of schooling, it was still true that fathers with low levels of education were less
3The levels of parents’ educational attainment included in Table 2 are No Education, Elementary School
Incomplete (between 1 and 5 years of schooling), Elementary School Complete (between 6 and 8 years of
schooling), and Middle School (between 9 and 11 years of schooling). I cannot include higher levels of
education because these are the only categories that can be constructed in the same consistent way across
the ENIGH, which is the data used for the rst stage.
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likely to send their kids to preschool. In consequence, enrollment rates reached only 83%
in households where the father has no education, but 90% among fathers with less than 6
years of education, 93% for fathers who completed elementary school, and 94% for fathers
who nished middle school.
Table 2 also provides an indicative setting for the parental responses that the new
compulsory education laws can potentially generate. As mentioned in section 2, enroll-
ment rates in rst grade were close to 100% previous to the reform; in fact, coverage in
elementary school has been universal since 1991, which means children from all back-
grounds attended elementary school irrespective of whether they went to preschool or
not. On one hand, if children from disadvantaged families were more likely to not attend
preschool and they are also the most aected by the reform, parents from these families
were forced to invest in education earlier than expected, and so they might have incen-
tives to reinforce such investment by increasing their involvement both during and after
the period when their children are potentially enrolled in preschool.
On the other hand, parents from more advantaged families can perceive a decrease
in quality from more crowded classrooms and also more kids from disadvantaged back-
grounds. In this case such parents might feel the need to compensate by doing the same,
increasing their involvement during and after the period when their children are poten-
tially enrolled in preschool. As I will show in the next section, it seems the eects on par-
ents’ behavior (as measured by the way they allocate both their own time and their chil-
dren’s time at home) are independent of the household income, but the parental responses
are stronger among more educated families, suggesting parental investments might be
compensatory with regard to quality of education.
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1.5.3 The Eect of Mandatory Preschool on Retention Rates
My rst set of results of the eect of mandatory preschool is related to academic outcomes.
Using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) I can examine if individuals who
were aected by the reform are less likely to be retained in any given grade. To account for
changes in the number of students over time and across states, I construct the retention
rate per 10,000 students using the individual data contained in the MxFLS and enrollment
data by year and state from the Mexican Secretariat of Education (SEP).
Figure 4 plots the reduced form RD relationships for the retention rate between 1st
and 3rd grade. In general, retention rates among students aected by the new compul-
sory education laws are lower in 1st and 2nd grade, with the eect being the strongest in
1st grade and fading out in subsequent grades. A slightly lower retention rate seems to be
also observed in 3rd grade, but the outcome in these level is very imprecisely estimated
given there are a small number of observations post-reform. Table 3 reports the eect of
having at least one year of preschool on the retention rate using being born after Septem-
ber 1, 1998 as the instrument. As mentioned in section 4, I will limit my analysis of the
eects of preschool attendance to a 2-year bandwidth for the distance from the birth date
cuto. Consistent with Figure 4, the results in Column (3) show that the strongest eect
of the reform was in 1st grade, where 3.8 less students are retained on average per 10,000
students. The eect is almost the same in 2nd grade, where on average 3.7 less students
are retained per 10,000 students.
The results in Table 3 do not include a 4-year bandwidth for the retention rate in 3rd
grade, and a 4- and 3-year bandwidth for the retention rate in 4th grade because of data
limitations. There are only 37 observations four years after the reform for 3rd grade, and
39 observations three years after and no observations four years after the reform for 4th
grade. For the same 2-year bandwidth and also consistent with Figure 4, Column (3) shows
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an insignicant eect of preschool attendance on retention rates in 3rd grade.
The estimates in Table 3 suggest then that the eects of preschool attendance on grade
retention dissipate as soon as students transition into 3rd grade. However, as explained
in the data section students in the MxFLS can be observed only up to 5th grade, with the
addition that my estimates using grade retention after 2nd grade are quite noisy because
of a small sample size. To overcome both of these issues, in the next section I examine
whether the reform has a longer term impact using an alternative data set.
1.5.4 The Eect of Mandatory Preschool on Number of Grades Completed Ac-
cording to Student’s Age
The results from the previous section suggest that having at least one year of preschool
reduces the likelihood of grade retention in 1st and 2nd grade, but it would be interesting
to observe longer term impacts of the new compulsory education laws. As explained in
the data section, I use a second source of data, the Mexican Employment Survey (ENOE),
to measure another academic outcome: the number of grades completed relative to the
student’s age. As with the MxFLS, the use of these data is convenient because I observe
student’s birth date, and in consequence I can identify cohorts who were and were not
aected by the reform. In contrast with the MxFLS, information about preschool atten-
dance is included in this survey, but the rst round was collected when the rst phase of
the reform was already in place. This is the reason why preschool attendance is taken
from a third dierent database.
The relevant data from the ENOE is for children who must have completed one or more
years of education. The ENOE is collected every three months since the rst trimester of
2005, with 20% of the sample being replaced every trimester, such that an individual can be
observed up to 1 year and three months. I use only individuals in the their last interview
to capture their maximum level of education achieved. For students with one or more
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years of education in the rst round of the ENOE (which corresponds to the academic
year 2006) there is at least one year of data pre-reform, and data availability pre- and
post-reform varies with the education level.
For example, a student with one year of education in the rst round of the survey must
have completed rst grade in or before 2005, and so there is (only) one year of data pre-
reform. The same type of student in subsequent rounds (i.e. with one year of education)
can be observed for a very long time after the reform, in particular 10 years4. In a similar
way, a student with two years of education in the rst round of the ENOE must have
completed second grade in or before 2005, and so there are two years of data pre-reform
and 9 years of data post-reform. For those with three years of education in the rst round
of the survey, there are 3 years of data pre-reform and 8 years of data post-reform, while
for those with four years of education in the rst round there are 4 years of data pre-
reform and 7 years of data post-reform. The last cohort analyzed here are students with
nine years of education, for whom there are 9 years of data pre-reform and 2 years of data
post-reform.
As with grade retention, I begin by visually examining the reduced form RD relation-
ship for number of grades completed relative to the student’s age. In each panel of Figure
5 I divide students according to the years of education they should have based on their
birth date, the academic year when they should be enrolled in rst grade, and the exact
date of the interview. Then I plot the years of education they have completed relative to
the years of education they should have. Panel A, for example, plots the average years
of education among students who should have one year of schooling, while panel B plots
the average years of education among students who should have two years of schooling.
In all panels individuals born in the last quarter are excluded as they usually have more
years of education as a consequence of school entry laws.
4The last round of the ENOE used in this study corresponds to the last trimester of 2016.
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The visual evidence of Figure 5 is quite noisy for those panels with either only a few
years of data pre-reform (Panels A and B) and only a few years of data post-reform (Panel
I). The rest of the panels show some evidence of an increase in years of education, although
such increase is not consistent across all levels of schooling. While there seems to be a
discontinuous jump for three and seven years of education, no signicant jump can be
observed in the other panels.
Table 4 reports the estimated eect of having at least one year of preschool on grades
completed using being born after September 1, 1998 as the instrument. Again, my analysis
will focus on a 2-year bandwidth around the birth date cuto. The results in Column (3)
show a plausibly longer term impact of the preschool policy across all years of education,
with individuals aected by the reform having 0.86 more years of education by the time
they should have completed elementary school (6 years of education) and 0.60 more years
of education by the time they should have completed middle school (9 years of education).
Except for what is observed at 5 years of education, the estimated coecients suggest
that the eect of the policy is stronger the more years of schooling students accumulate
between 2nd and 4th grade, and starts fading out afterwards at a very slow rate, such that
a strong positive eect can still be observed at the end of 9th grade. Although there are
no other educational variables that can be explored in the Mexican Employment Survey,
the results reported in Table 4 are very suggestive of a longer term eect of mandatory
preschool on student achievement.
1.5.5 The Eect of Mandatory Preschool on Cognitive Outcomes
The results from Sections 5.2 and 5.3 above, although derived from two dierent data
sets, are two sides of the same coin: if students are eectively less likely to be retained as
a result of being forced to attend preschool, then you should expect them to accumulate
more years of schooling. The next question I try to answer is what is driving both of these
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results. Information available in the MxFLS allows me to analyze whether students are
less likely to be retained in 1st and 2nd grade because attending preschool fosters their
cognitive development. Although Table 3 suggests there are no eects of preschool on
retention in 3rd and 4th grade, my analysis still includes students in these grades given
the longer term impacts observed in Table 4.
To measure the level of children’s cognitive ability I use the responses to Raven’s
Progressive Matrices that are part of the MxFLS. As described in the data section, the
proportion of correct answers is normed such that it has mean zero and standard deviation
one pre-reform. The analysis is conducted in two ways, using a within-age comparison
at the time students are supposed to be enrolled in 1st to 4th grade (6 to 9 years old),
and using a within-grade comparison for each grade between 1st and 4th grade. Neither
within-age nor within-grade comparisons are preferred; the former is just indicative of
whether potential dierences in cognitive ability arise at a particular age, and the latter
identies whether those potential dierences arise while attending a particular grade.
Figure 6 plots the reduced form RD relationship for student’s test score by age, and
Figure 7 plots this relationship by grade. One particular concern in this case is the sample
size at each individual age/grade, and so Panel A in both gures uses the pooled sample
to increase precision5. If, as often hypothesized, preschool attendance positively impacts
children’s school readiness, test scores should increase discontinuously at the birth date
cuto. In any case such discontinuous increase is actually observed, i.e. having completed
the grade previous to 1st grade does not have an eect on cognitive ability as measured
by the number of correct answers in the Raven’s Matrices.
The results from Table 5, which report coecients on the eect of completing the
grade previous to 1st grade using being born after September 1, 1998 as the instrument,
conrm that there is no eect of preschool attendance on student’s cognitive ability. This
5Age and grade xed eects are partialled out in these panels.
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subsection suggests in consequence that preschool attendance can reduce grade reten-
tion and improve grade progression without aecting children’s cognitive ability. Such
nding is consistent with a previous study where the eect of preschool attendance on
cognitive skills disappears by the time children enter 1st grade (Magnuson, Ruhm, and
Waldfogel, 2007), as well as studies suggesting that progression through school may in-
volve more display of non-cognitive skills than test taking (e.g. Fitzpatrick (2008)). In this
study I cannot test whether there is an eect of the new compulsory education laws on
measures of non-cognitive outcomes, but the next section looks at another very plausible
channel through which improvements in educational achievement might arise: changes
in parent’s behavior.
1.6 Preschool Attendance and Parent’s Behavior
Given the young ages at which preschool attendance occurs, it is reasonable to believe that
parents will play an important role in their children’s educational and non-educational
outcomes both, during and after the time they potentially attended preschool. In fact,
school attendance at the preschool and elementary levels must be occurring because of
parents’ decision of sending their children to school, and not because of children’s intrin-
sic motivation6. This might be the reason why some small scale early childhood education
programs have been designed to include a parental component.
Except for the obligation of enrolling their children in preschool according to the
phase-in of the reform, the change in compulsory education laws in Mexico did not include
a parental component. However, parents’ reports in the MxFLS about both, their own and
their children’s time allocation, allows me to investigate whether there is a change in
6It is reasonable to believe that previous to the reform school attendance at the elementary level must
had happened because of compulsory education laws; however, the Mexican government does not take any
actions to enforce this requirement. Sending their children to elementary school is more of a social norm
that every parent is expected to follow.
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parental behavior in response to the policy. Reallocation of time is certainly expected
during the period when children are forced to attend preschool, as they now nd them-
selves having to spend some time at school. However, my analysis here will focus on
whether parents reallocate time after their children potentially attended preschool.
As with the measures of cognitive ability, I analyze changes in time allocation using a
within-age comparison for children between 6 and 9 years old, and a within-grade com-
parison for children who were in 1st to 4th grade at the time of the interview. All gures
for the RD relationship included in this section use the pooled sample by age or grade
to increase precision, with age xed eects partialled out in within-age gures and both
age and grade xed eects partialled out in within-grade gures. All the tables for the
two sample two stage least squares estimator use the same pooled sample and a 2-year
bandwidth.
1.6.1 Eect on Children’s Time Allocation
The MxFLS asks parents to report whether their children performed dierent activities the
week previous to the interview (extensive margin), and if they did how many hours they
spent in these activities (intensive margin). As before, I begin by plotting the reduced form
relationship between distance to the birth date cuto and each reported activity. Figures
8 (extensive margin) and 9 (intensive margin) plot such relationship for children between
6 and 9 years old, while Figures 10 (extensive margin) and 11 (intensive margin) plot the
results among children enrolled in 1st to 4th grade at the time of the interview. In these
graphs variables are normed such that they have mean zero and standard deviation one
previous to the reform.
In all gures there are two activities that seem to show a discontinuous jump in the
raw data: whether children did domestic housework (Panel D), and whether children took
care of elderly or sick people, and/or children/brothers (Panel F). Panel D of Figures 8
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and 9 show that preschool attendance reduces both the likelihood and the number of
hours children spend doing domestic housework by the time they should be in elementary
school, while Panel F shows that they spend less hours taking care of other household
members. The same pattern is observed in Figures 10 and 11, although the discontinuous
jump is a little less clear.
To conrm whether preschool attendance eectively changes time spent on domestic
housework and taking care of other household members, Tables 6 and 7 report the eect
of having at least one year of preschool on children’s time allocation after they attended
preschool using being born after September 1, 1998 as the instrument. Table 6 uses a
within-age comparison, while Table 7 uses a within-grade comparison. Having at least
one year of preschool reduces the probability of doing domestic housework on a given
week between 78.3 and 81.5 percentage points, and the number of hours on a given day
between 1.26 (8.188/7) and 1.33 (9.288/7). The probability of taking care of other house-
hold members decreases in 43.7 percentage points, and the number of hours between 1.10
(7.588/7) and 1.20 (8.412/7). There seems to be a decrease in the time children spent on
the internet, but such decrease is of about 5 minutes.
What is important about domestic housework and taking care of other household
members is that these must be activities that parents assign to their children, as opposed
to activities that children themselves feel motivated to do. The hypothesis this study is
trying to make is not only that parents are the ones who reallocate their children’s time,
but that such reallocation is an indirect impact that is mediated through the eect that
preschool attendance has on parent investment in children. In an ideal world, a follow up
question to whether a child did domestic housework while in elementary school would
be “if not, was it because she had to attend preschool?”. In a more ideal world, preschool
attendance would be completely randomized, and changes in time allocation could be in-
terpreted as a causal eect. In absence of such ideal setting, I can investigate if parents
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change the way in which they allocate their own time in addition to their children’s and,
if they do, whether such changes are in activities potentially related with their investment
decisions on them7.
1.6.2 Eect on Parent’s Time Allocation
As with their children, parents also report whether they performed dierent activities the
week previous to the interview, and if they did for how many hours. The set of activities
is essentially the same, except that domestic housework is divided between cleaning and
cooking. Because the results are the same whether I use a within-age or a within-grade
comparison, I focus here on the within-age estimates.
Figures 12 and 13 plot the reduced form relationship for father’s time allocation and
Figures 14 and 15 for mother’s time allocation, when their children are potentially enrolled
in 1st to 4th grade (6 to 9 years old). In each graph variables are normed such that they
have mean zero and standard deviation one previous to the reform. Except for a couple of
activities, there does not seem to be a change in they way fathers allocate their time. Some
panels in Figures 12 and 13 show a potentially discontinuous jump at the threshold, but is
not possible to clearly observe a relationship between distance to the birth date cuto and
the activities reported in these panels, and the local linear regressions on each side of the
cuto are very imprecisely estimated. Table 8, which reports the two sample estimator
from equation (2), conrms that no signicant change in father’s time allocation can be
attributed to attending preschool.
A similar pattern is observed for mothers except for one activity, the time they spend
helping study of doing homework with their children. Although very suggestive, Panel
7A large body of literature has looked at changes in parents’ labor supply, especially mothers. I do not
analyze here changes in labor supply, although a very preliminary analysis suggests that neither fathers nor
mothers behave dierently in this outcome as a consequence of the new compulsory education laws. How-
ever, using the same policy change De La Cruz Toledo (2015) nds that preschool enrollment signicantly
increased the labor supply of mothers of three and four year olds.
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G of Figures 14 and 15 show that there is a plausible increase in both the probability
that mothers spend time studying with their kids, and the number of hours they spend
studying with them. Table 9 reports the two sample instrumental variables estimator
from equation (2), which conrms that having at least one year of preschool increases the
probability that mothers spend time studying with their children in any given day by 65.7
percentage points, and the number of hours they spend studying with them every day by
0.73 (5.132/7).
The policy also seems to have a large eect on the amount of time mothers spend
watching TV, which decreases in 2.3 hours a day (15.997/7). One possible explanation for
such a signicant decrease is that, if mothers are spending more time studying with their
kids, then they should also be spending less time in another activity, potentially watching
TV. However, such decrease more than triples the increase in the time mothers spend
studying with their children. Additionally, as explained in the previous section there is
evidence that the new compulsory education laws increased mother’s labor supply, which
can also explain this drop in the time mothers spend watching TV. Because the goal of
this paper is to analyze parental investments, I will focus here (and in particular in the
next subsection) in the eect of preschool on the time mothers spend studying with their
children.
Overall, preschool attendance seems to improve elementary and middle school per-
formance −as measured by the probability of repeating a grade and years of schooling
completed−, but such improvement is not associated with an increase in student’s level
of cognitive ability. Although this study cannot test whether noncognitive outcomes could
explain this better performance in elementary and middle school, the results in this section
suggest that preschool attendance also modies children’s home environment through
changes in parents’ behavior that are potentially associated with the level of parental in-
vestments. In particular, at the time they are potentially enrolled in elementary school,
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students are less likely to perform non-school related activities that must be assigned by
their parents, i.e. doing domestic housework and taking care of other households mem-
bers, and their mothers are more likely to spend time studying with them.
As previously indicated, the reform had its stronger eects on the probability of com-
pleting the last year of preschool among children of disadvantaged families with low levels
of income and low levels of parental education. It is important then to understand what
is the set of households where parents modify their behavior. On one side, the reform
can make disadvantaged households aware of the value of education, motivating parents
to invest more in their children. It is also possible that the reform forces these house-
holds to invest in education earlier that expected, and so parents in these homes can try
to reinforce their investment by increasing involvement with their children. On the other
side, the new compulsory education laws make less likely that students repeat a grade in
elementary school and they also accumulate more years of education up to middle school,
which means they remain in school longer. In consequence, on average the reform must
be increasing the likelihood of attending school with a disadvantaged child both during
and after preschool. In this case, parents from more advantaged households might be the
ones who increase involvement with their children if they perceive a need to compensate
at home for the lower quality of peers at school. The next section attempts to identify the
set of households where there is a change in parents’ behavior.
1.7 Heterogenous Eect of Preschool Attendance
Up to this point this study reinforces what previous analyses of early childhood educa-
tion have shown: there is a positive eect on educational attainment, and its eects on
cognitive outcomes, if any, dissipate soon enough that they are not evident by the time
students enter 1st grade. The above analysis contributes to this literature by showing that
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any early childhood intervention that fails to account for the interaction between schools
and parents is likely to ignore the ways in which parental investments change as a result
of such interventions. In contrast to some small-scale high-quality preschool programs
that include a parental component, this study suggests that even without being targeted
parents modify their behavior at home in response to being forced to send their kids to
school at a very early stage.
In this section I try to answer a last question, which is who are the parents who change
their behavior at home. I use the same set of households characteristics from Section 5.2,
which are level of income and parents’ education. Based on the results from the previous
section, I focus here on the three activities where I observe a change: (1) whether children
did domestic housework, (2) whether children took care of elderly/sick people or other
children/siblings, and (3) whether mothers spent time studying or doing homework with
their children. The results do not change for the other activities reported in Figures 8 to
15 and Tables 6 to 9, that is, no signicant change is observed when these activities are
analyzed by income level and parents’ level of education, which conrms that there is no
redistribution of time in any other activity except the three ones I focus on here8. As in
the previous section, in order to increase precision all gures included in this section use
a pooled sample by age for children between 6 and 9 years old9.
Figure 16 plots the reduced form RD relationship by income quintiles. Each point rep-
resents the interaction between an indicator variable for being born after September 1,
1998 and an indicator variable for a child living in a household where income is within a
particular quintile. Panel A shows that income does not seem to be related with a decrease
in the time children spend doing domestic housework; there is a signicant decrease in
8The number of hours mothers spent watching TV is the only exception. When analyzed by income, the
eect observed on average seems to be driven by quintiles II and III, and when analyzed by parents’ level
of education the eect observed on average seems to be signicant among all levels of schooling.
9Results are the same when using the pooled sample by grade, so the analysis focuses on the within-age
estimates.
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both the probability and the number of hours children spend in this activity across the
whole income distribution. A similar pattern is observed for the probability that mothers
spend time studying with their children, although for the number of hours mothers spend
in this activity the observed average eect seems to concentrate in quintiles I and IV. Some
dierences favoring more advantaged children start arising when looking at Panel B, es-
pecially for the number of hours children spend taking care of other household members;
such hours decrease signicantly only among children who live in households in the top
two quintiles. In general there is no clear pattern for the relationship between income and
time reallocation, as children and parents seem to be aected (or unaected) fairly equally
among all income quintiles, despite the fact that the reform had its stronger eects among
households in the rst three quintiles.
Figures 17 and 18 plot the same reduced form RD relationships by father’s and mother’s
level of education, respectively. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the levels of parental educa-
tion that can be constructed in the same consistent way across each cross-section used for
the rst stage are No Education, Elementary School Incomplete (between 1 and 5 years of
schooling), Elementary School Complete (between 6 and 8 years of schooling), and Mid-
dle School Complete (between 9 and 11 years of education). Although higher levels of
education can be identied in the Mexican Family Life Survey, which is the data source
used in this section, Figures 17 and 18 use the same levels of schooling used in the rst
stage. Similar to Figure 16, each point represents the interaction between an indicator
variable for being born after September 1, 1998 and an indicator variable for a child living
in a household where the parents have a particular education level.
Figure 17 shows that the average eects observed in the last section are driven by fa-
thers who at least completed elementary school. In any of the activities included in this
gure −both at the extensive and the intensive margin− there is a statistically signicant
eect in households where the father has either no education or did not nish elementary
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school. As shown in Table 2, the reform had about the same eect on preschool enroll-
ment across all levels of father’s education, even though previous to the reform children
from households where the father had no education were less likely to attend preschool.
However, Figure 17 indicates that is only among households where fathers have higher
levels of education that there is a redistribution of time in activities that can be thought
as an indirect impact that is mediated through the eect that preschool attendance has on
parent investment in children. This is particularly true for whether mothers spend more
time studying with their children, but as I have argued doing domestic housework and
taking care of other households members must be activities that parents assign to their
children, as opposed to activities that children themselves feel motivated to do.
The results in Figure 18 reinforce what is observed in Figure 17. I begin by examin-
ing Panel C in this gure, which shows the reduced form RD relationship for whether
mothers spend time studying with their children by mother’s education level. Only chil-
dren in households where the mother completed at least elementary school are both more
likely to spend time studying with their mothers and they also spend more hours doing
so. Because this activity is measured when children are potentially enrolled in elemen-
tary school, it might be somehow expected that mothers who have either no education
or did not nish elementary school are unable to help study or do homework with their
children. However, Panels A and B show that is consistently only among mothers with
higher levels of education that a redistribution of time is observed. Only children who live
in households where the mother completed middle school are less likely to perform do-
mestic housework and taking care of other household members. At the intensive margin,
except for mothers with no education there is a decrease in the hours children spend doing
domestic housework across all education levels, but is true again that only in households
where the mother completed middle school children spend less time taking care of other
household members.
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Taking all together, the results from Figures 17 and 18 suggest that is among more ed-
ucated parents that there is a reallocation of time in activities that can be directly linked to
the level of parental investments −the time mothers spend studying with their children−,
and in activities that indirectly also reect parents’ investment in their children −doing
domestic housework and taking care of other households members. Figure 16 on the
other hand shows that reallocation of time is equally likely (or unlikely) across the whole
income distribution. Then, on average, the reform had its stronger impacts on parents’
behavior among more advantaged households with high levels of income and high levels
of parental education, even though the same reform had its stronger eects on preschool
enrollment among children of more disadvantaged households with low levels of income
and low levels of parental education.
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, given the eects that the new compul-
sory education laws had on educational outcomes (as measured by preschool attendance,
the probability of repeating a grade in elementary school, and the years of schooling com-
pleted up to middle school), on average the reform must be increasing the likelihood of
attending school with a disadvantaged child both during and after preschool. The results
in this section, which show that parents from more advantaged households are the ones
who increase involvement with their children, suggest that more educated parents might
perceive a need to compensate at home for a potentially lower quality of education at
school. Although such conclusion requires further investigation, is in line with recent
studies that show parents react in an opposite direction to changes in school resources:
increased resources at school (e.g. higher quality peers) lead to a decrease in parental
eort, while a decrease in school resources leads parents to increase their eort.
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1.8 Conclusion
Using a change in compulsory education laws that made preschool (children 3 to 5 years
old) mandatory in Mexico, this study shows that having attended a formal education cen-
ter for at least one year before entering 1st grade decreases the probability of repeating
a grade in elementary school and, in consequence, students accumulate more years of
education up to middle school. My results reinforce previous studies where observed ed-
ucational improvements after preschool are not necessarily explained by higher levels of
cognitive ability. Although non-cognitive channels cannot be tested, this study shows
that preschool attendance has an indirect eect on parental behavior after the time when
their children were potentially enrolled in this education level. Preschool attendance does
not only seem to increase the level of parental investments (or parental eort) when their
children are enrolled in elementary school, but such increase seems to be driven by more
advantaged households with high levels of income and high levels of parents’ education.
Although further investigation is required, one possible explanation for this last result is
that parents might perceive a decrease in school resources, as students are more likely to
attend school with disadvantaged children both during and after preschool.
From a policy perspective, my results suggest that any early childhood intervention
that fails to account for the interaction between parents and schools is likely to underesti-
mate the eects that such interventions have on parents behavior beyond changes in their
labor supply. Some small scale interventions like The Perry School Project and Head Start
have acknowledged the role that parents play in children’s development, and so they are
designed not only to improve access to early education but to increase parent involvement
with their children. Given the explicit parental component, changes in parents’ behavior
are certainly expected, but expansions based on the success of these small scale programs
fail to account for the fact that changes in parental involvement are not exclusive of low
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income children, which are usually the target of these small scale programs.
From the same policy perspective, this study provides some indirect evidence that
increasing access to early childhood education must be accompanied by an increase in
quality if the government’s objective is to generate stronger impacts among children of
disadvantaged families. In the policy here studied, universal access to preschool was pro-
vided through changes in compulsory education, as opposed to increasing the number
of schools, (qualied) teachers, and/or classrooms. The stronger eect of the policy on
preschool enrollment was among children from households with low income and low lev-
els of parental education, which is likely to increase the probability of attending school
with disadvantaged children. Without changes in quality, universal access to preschool
education in the particular context here studied seems to increase parental investments
among children of more advantaged families, and not among those children the Mexican
government probably had in mind.
This work leaves at the same time some unanswered questions that future research
can attempt to answer. The rst one is whether the potential explanation for behavioral
changes among more educated parents is actually true. I have hypothesized that given the
stronger eect of the policy on preschool attendance was among disadvantaged children,
and also given the eect of the policy on educational outcomes implies students remain
in school longer, it must be true that students are more likely to attend school with a
disadvantaged child both during and after preschool. An extension of this paper could
then investigate the relationship between peer quality and changes in parents’ behavior,
and show there is an increase in parental investments when there is decrease in quality.
Another important extension would be to investigate additional reasons for the observed
behavioral changes among more educated parents dierent than the one outlined here.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1·1: Enrollment Rates in Preschool
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(b) 4 year-olds
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(c) 3 year-olds
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(d) 3 to 5 year-olds
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Notes: In each graph, the solid vertical line indicates the time when enrollment rates should be close to 100%.
Source: Mexican Secretariat of Education (SEP).
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Figure 1·2: Probability of Completing the Grade Previous to 1st Grade
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and dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.
Notes: Each point repres nts a aver ge value within 120-days intervals. The solid line plots a local linear
regression and dashed lines show 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 1·4: Reduced forms for retention per 10,000 students
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Figure 1·6: Reduced forms for Raven Test Score by Age
(a) 6 to 9 Years Old
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Notes: Each point represents an average value within 120-days intervals. Month and year of the survey
xed eects have been partialled out in all panels. Additionally, age xed eects have been partialled out
in Panel A. The solid line plots a local linear regression and dashed lines show 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 1·7: Reduced forms for Raven Test Score by Grade
(a) 1st to 4th Grade
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Notes: Each point represents an average value within 120-days intervals. Month and year of the survey as
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ects have been partialled out in all panels. Additionally, grade xed eects have been
partialled out in panel A. The solid line plots a local linear regression and dashed lines show 95% condence
intervals.
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Figure 1·16: Reduced Forms by Household Income Level (Children 6 to 9)
(a) Domestic Chores: Extensive
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(b) Domestic Chores: Intensive
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(c) Took Care HH: Extensive
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(d) Took Care HH: Intensive
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(e) Mother Helped Study: Extensive
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(f) Mother Helped Study: Intensive
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Notes: Each point reports the coecient on an indicator variable for being born after September 1, 1998 in
a reduced form RD regression, as given by equation (1) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD
polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. All regressions include month and year of
the survey xed eects, as well as age and income quintile xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the
state and birth date level. The solid lines show 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 1·17: Reduced forms by Father’s Education Level (Children 6 to 9)
(a) Domestic Chores: Extensive
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(b) Domestic Chores: Intensive
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(c) Took Care HH: Extensive
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(d) Took Care HH: Intensive
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(e) Mother Helped Study: Extensive
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(f) Mother Helped Study: Intensive
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Notes: Each point reports the coecient on an indicator variable for being born after September 1, 1998 in
a reduced form RD regression, as given by equation (1) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD
polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. All regressions include month and year of
the survey xed eects, as well as age and father’s education xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at
the state and birth date level. The solid lines show 95% condence intervals. Levels of education are 0=No
Education, 1=Elementary Incomplete, 2=Elementary, 3=Middle School.
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Figure 1·18: Reduced forms by Mother’s Education Level (Children 6 to 9)
(a) Domestic Chores: Extensive
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
D
om
es
tic
 C
ho
re
s 
(E
xte
ns
ive
 M
arg
in)
0 1 2 3
Mother Education
(b) Domestic Chores: Intensive
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
3
D
om
es
tic
 C
ho
re
s 
(In
ten
siv
e M
arg
in)
0 1 2 3
Mother Education
(c) Took Care HH: Extensive
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(d) Took Care HH: Intensive
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(e) Mother Helped Study: Extensive
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(f) Mother Helped Study: Intensive
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Notes: Each point reports the coecient on an indicator variable for being born after September 1, 1998 in
a reduced form RD regression, as given by equation (1) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD
polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. All regressions include month and year of
the survey xed eects, as well as age and mother’s education xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at
the state and birth date level. The solid lines show 95% condence intervals. Levels of education are 0=No
Education, 1=Elementary Incomplete, 2=Elementary, 3=Middle School.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: RD Coecients for Pre-determined Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bandwidth around September 1, 1998
Dependent Variable 4 Years 3 Years 2 Years 1 Year
% Male 0.036 0.057 0.06 0.084
[0.026] [0.030]* [0.037] [0.052]
Observations 6,670 5,013 3,386 1,641
% Spanish 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.013
[0.008] [0.009] [0.011] [0.015]
Observations 6,062 4,581 3,132 1,512
% Indigenous Language -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.022
[0.016] [0.018] [0.022] [0.029]
Observations 6,062 4,581 3,132 1,512
Father’s Age -0.288 0.083 -0.177 0.286
[0.493] [0.567] [0.708] [0.989]
Observations 5,231 3,932 2,641 1,287
Father’s Age 1st Grade 0.015 0.099 0.007 0.204
[0.128] [0.154] [0.214] [0.354]
Observations 4,507 3,397 2,279 1,109
Mother’s Age -0.375 -0.175 -0.378 -0.152
[0.361] [0.416] [0.507] [0.718]
Observations 6,342 4,766 3,226 1,561
Mother’s Age 1st Grade 0.073 -0.005 -0.05 -0.023
[0.080] [0.091] [0.125] [0.147]
Observations 5,881 4,422 3,005 1,462
Notes: Each column reports the coecient on an indicator variable for being
born after September 1, 1998 in RD regressions. The regression also includes
a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold.
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the birth date and state level. (∗p <
.10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.2: First Stage
Dependent Variable:
Student completed the grade previous to 1st grade
Panel A Bandwidth around September 1, 1998
4 Years 3 Years 2 Years 1 Year
Born after September 1, 1998 0.183 0.205 0.231 0.201
[0.034]*** [0.038]*** [0.047]*** [0.031]***
Observations 11,646 8,972 5,980 3,160
Panel B Income Quintile
I II III IV V
Born after September 1, 1998 0.289 0.255 0.289 0.178 0.175
(Bandwidth = 2 Years) [0.061]*** [0.056]*** [0.061]*** [0.050]*** [0.046]***
Mean Pre-Reform 0.638 0.708 0.684 0.790 0.799
Panel C Father Education Level
0 1 2 3
Born after September 1, 1998 0.221 0.215 0.242 0.216
(Bandwidth = 2 Years) [0.067]*** [0.052]*** [0.060]*** [0.077]***
Mean Pre-Reform 0.613 0.686 0.684 0.721
Panel D Mother Education Level
0 1 2 3
Born after September 1, 1998 0.340 0.217 0.274 0.215
(Bandwidth = 2 Years) [0.068]*** [0.061]*** [0.064]*** [0.078]***
Mean Pre-Reform 0.601 0.697 0.705 0.770
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the student completed the grade
previous to 1st grade. Born after September 1, 1998 is an indicator variable equal one if a student was
born after that date. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either
side of the threshold, as well as an indicator for gender and year of the survey xed eects. Results
in Panel B are coecients of the interaction between Born after September 1, 1998 and income
quintile, and the regressions also include income quintile xed eects. Results in Panels C and D are
coecients of the interaction between Born after September 1, 1998 and parent education level, and
the regressions also include education level xed eects. Levels of education are 0=No Education,
1=Elementary Incomplete, 2=Elementary, and 3=Middle School. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered at the birth date and state level. (∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.3: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares for Reten-
tion Rate
Dependent Variable:
Retention rate per 10,000 students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bandwidth around September 1, 1998
4 Years 3 Years 2 Years 1 Year
1st Grade -3.687 -6.269 -3.827 -5.612
[1.581]** [2.169]*** [2.056]* [3.144]*
Observations 5,982 4,546 3,056 1,567
2nd Grade -2.398 -5.415 -3.674 -5.135
[1.551] [1.923]*** [2.058]* [3.015]*
Observations 5,094 3,971 2,647 1,358
3rd Grade -4.027 -3.189 -4.062
[2.050]** [2.335] [3.202]
Observations 3,526 2,488 1,312
4th Grade -1.041 -4.707
[2.436] [3.555]
Observations 2,149 1,240
Notes: Each column reports the ratio of the coecient on an in-
dicator variable for being born after September 1, 1998 in separate
RD regressions for the rst stage and the reduced form, as given
by equation (2) in the text. The regressions also include a linear
RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold.
Standard errors in brackets are computed using Inoue and Solon
(2010). (∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.4: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares for Grades Completed
Relative to Age
Dependent Variable:
Years of education student must have according to her age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bandwidth around September 1, 1998
4 Years 3 Years 2 Years 1 Year
1-Year of Education 0.852
[0.300]***
Observations 7,124
2-Years of Education 0.367 1.015
[0.143]** [0.349]***
Observations 14,284 7,071
3-Years of Education 0.565 0.651 1.857
[0.136]*** [0.178]*** [0.600]***
Observations 21,157 13,978 6,880
4-Years of Education 0.329 0.558 0.884 1.536
[0.119]*** [0.147]*** [0.206]*** [0.511]***
Observations 27,590 20,544 13,719 6,719
5-Years of Education -0.005 0.15 0.325 1.851
[0.126] [0.147] [0.191]* [0.608]***
Observations 27,526 20,416 13,388 6,569
6-Years of Education 0.291 0.522 0.855 1.548
[0.136]** [0.165]*** [0.229]*** [0.544]***
Observations 27,272 20,035 13,429 6,600
7-Years of Education 0.53 0.512 0.712 1.503
[0.159]*** [0.184]*** [0.245]*** [0.583]***
Observations 26,797 19,863 13,024 6,365
8-Years of Education 0.14 0.663 1.239
[0.212] [0.285]** [0.596]**
Observations 19,225 12,767 6,272
9-Years of Education 0.600 1.038
[0.297]** [0.613]*
Observations 12,782 6,232
Notes: Each column reports the ratio of the coecient on an indicator variable for
being born after September 1, 1998 in separate RD regressions for the rst stage and
the reduced form, as given by equation (2) in the text. The regressions also include a
linear RD polynomial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. Standard
errors in brackets are computed using Inoue and Solon (2010). (∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05,
∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.5: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares for Raven’s Test Score
Dependent Variable: Raven’s Test Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bandwidth around September 1, 1998
4 Years 3 Years 2 Years 1 Year
Panel A: Results by Age
Pooled Sample (6 to 9 Years Old) 0.298 -0.035 -0.512 -0.881
[0.405] 0.497 0.615 0.827
Observations 5,314 3,947 2,402 1,189
6 Years Old 0.029 0.078 -0.611 -0.31
[0.865] [0.886] [1.115] [1.215]
Observations 1,294 1,097 637 484
7 Years Old -1.425 -1.248 -1.145 -1.496
[1.163] [1.266] [1.276] [1.532]
Observations 1,543 718 644 555
8 Years Old 0.489 1.662 1.708 2.471
[2.059] [2.853] [3.148] [7.472]
Observations 1,214 990 584 117
9 Years Old -0.785 -3.346 -7.135 -4.635
[4.246] [7.285] [17.639] [35.159]
Observations 1,263 1,142 537 33
Panel B: Results by Grade
Pooled Sample (1st to 4th Grade) 0.396 0.012 -0.042 -0.059
[0.469] [0.525] [0.578] [0.724]
Observations 5,498 3,769 2,486 1,212
1st Grade -0.671 -0.371 -0.327 -0.38
[0.771] [0.921] [1.031] [1.214]
Observations 1,554 757 591 492
2nd Grade -0.612 -1.567 -1.467 -2.44
[1.226] [1.584] [1.786] [3.626]
Observations 1,361 1,048 660 214
3rd Grade 2.36 2.088 1.435 -0.238
[2.276] [2.267] [2.120] [2.575]
Observations 1,426 1,218 670 155
4th Grade 1.817 1.268 1.269 1.371
[1.508] [1.425] [1.514] [2.056]
Observations 1,157 746 565 351
Notes: Each column reports the ratio of the coecient on an indicator variable for being
born after September 1, 1998 in separate RD regressions for the rst stage and the reduced
form, as given by equation (2) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD polyno-
mial estimated separately on either side of the threshold. All regressions in Panel A include
month and year of the survey xed eects, and the pooled sample includes age xed eects.
All regressions in Panel B include month, year of the survey and age xed eects, and the
pooled sample includes grade xed eects. Standard errors in brackets are computed using
Inoue and Solon (2010). (∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.6: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares for Children’s Time Allocation
(Ages 6 to 9)
Dependent Variable: During the past week, did (name of the boy/girl) (...)?
(1) (2)
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(a) Participate in sport, cultural or 0.169 1.829
entertainment activities [0.217] [1.422]
(b) Go to any educational center, -0.107 -0.844
without including formal school [0.123] [1.180]
(c) Watch TV 0.232 -3.012
[0.181] [6.094]
(d) Do domestic housework -0.783 -8.188
[0.372]** [3.801]**
(e) Play inside or outside the 0.292 2.859
house [0.208] [8.604]
(f) Take care of elderly or sick people, -0.266 -8.412
and/or children/brothers [0.128]** [3.782]**
(g) Carry rewood 0.073 0.253
[0.097] [0.392]
(h) Carry water 0.069 0.254
[0.086] [0.312]
(i) Do any agricultural activity -0.023 0.376
[0.061] [0.536]
(j) Helped brothers or other household 0.0164 0.358
members to study or do homework [0.0122] [0.597]
(k) Read -0.31 -2.107
[0.278] [1.806]
(l) Use internet -0.091 -0.625
[0.087] [0.304]**
Observations 2,464 2,464
Notes: Each column reports the ratio of the coecient on an indicator variable for being born
after September 1, 1998 in separate RD regressions for the rst stage and the reduced form, as
given by equation (2) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD polynomial estimated
separately on either side of the threshold. Bandwidth around September 1, 1998 is 2 years. Sample
includes pooled children of 6 to 9 years old. All regressions include month and year of the survey
and age xed eects. Standard errors in brackets are computed using Inoue and Solon (2010).
(∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.7: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares for Children’s Time Allocation
(Grades 1 to 4)
Dependent Variable: During the past week, did (name of the boy/girl) (...)?
(1) (2)
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(a) Participate in sport, cultural or -0.05 0.463
entertainment activities [0.225] [1.506]
(b) Go to any educational center, 0.011 -0.412
without including formal school [0.109] [1.275]
(c) Watch TV 0.158 -0.586
[0.173] [6.188]
(d) Do domestic housework -0.815 -9.288
[0.372]** [4.612]**
(e) Play inside or outside the 0.356 13.542
house [0.221] [9.425]
(f) Take care of elderly or sick people, -0.437 -7.588
and/or children/brothers [0.190]** [3.544]**
(g) Carry rewood -0.066 -0.315
[0.130] [0.528]
(h) Carry water 0.037 0.285
[0.119] [0.381]
(i) Do any agricultural activity -0.054 -1.464
[0.084] [1.532]
(j) Helped brothers or other household 0.107 -0.036
members to study or do homework [0.167] [0.713]
(k) Read -0.277 -0.817
[0.291] [1.634]
(l) Use internet -0.042 -1.211
[0.135] [0.969]
Observations 2,560 2,560
Notes: Each column reports the ratio of the coecient on an indicator variable for being born
after September 1, 1998 in separate RD regressions for the rst stage and the reduced form, as
given by equation (2) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD polynomial estimated
separately on either side of the threshold. Bandwidth around September 1, 1998 is 2 years. Sample
includes pooled children in Grades 1 to 4. All regressions include month and year of the survey,
age and grade xed eects. Standard errors in brackets are computed using Inoue and Solon
(2010). (∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.8: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares for Father’s Time Allocation (Ages
6 to 9)
Dependent Variable: During the past week, did you (...)?
(1) (2)
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(a) Make or participate in sport, cultural -0.769 -3.222
or entertainment cctivities [0.457]* [2.465]
(b) Watch TV 0.026 7.662
[0.259] [6.940]
(c) Read -0.413 -5.71
[0.397] [4.190]
(d) Cook/Prepare food -0.551 -1.029
[0.383] [2.287]
(e) Wash clothes and/or -0.36 -2.959
clean your house [0.330] [2.514]
(f) Take care of elderly or sick people, 0.02 -0.818
and/or children [0.317] [5.952]
(g) Help any home member to -0.249 -0.017
study or make homeworks [0.343] [2.312]
(h) Use internet 0.051 -0.723
[0.186] [1.546]
Observations 1,500 1,500
Notes: Each column reports the ratio of the coecient on an indicator variable for being born
after September 1, 1998 in separate RD regressions for the rst stage and the reduced form, as
given by equation (2) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD polynomial estimated
separately on either side of the threshold. Bandwidth around September 1, 1998 is 2 years. Sample
includes pooled children of 6 to 9 years old. All regressions include month and year of the survey,
and age xed eects. Standard errors in brackets are computed using Inoue and Solon (2010).
(∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
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Table 1.9: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares for Mother’s Time Allocation (Ages
6 to 9)
Dependent Variable: During the past week, did you (...)?
(1) (2)
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(a) Make or participate in sport, cultural -0.151 0.862
or entertainment cctivities [0.152] [2.053]
(b) Watch TV -0.03 -15.997
[0.184] [7.882]**
(c) Read -0.045 -2.374
[0.277] [2.335]
(d) Cook/Prepare food 0.028 3.3
[0.114] [4.798]
(e) Wash clothes and/or -0.274 -4.923
clean your house [0.168] [5.256]
(f) Take care of elderly or sick people, 0.367 16.56
and/or children [0.309] [15.234]
(g) Help any home member to 0.657 5.132
study or make homeworks [0.263]** [2.100]**
(h) Use internet -0.128 -0.823
[0.162] [3.066]
Observations 2,316 2,316
Notes: Each column reports the ratio of the coecient on an indicator variable for being born
after September 1, 1998 in separate RD regressions for the rst stage and the reduced form, as
given by equation (2) in the text. The regressions also include a linear RD polynomial estimated
separately on either side of the threshold. Bandwidth around September 1, 1998 is 2 years. Sample
includes pooled children of 6 to 9 years old. All regressions include month and year of the survey,
and age xed eects. Standard errors in brackets are computed using Inoue and Solon (2010).
(∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01)
Chapter 2
Do Group Monetary Incentives Inuence the
Measurement of Peer Eects? Evidence from
The Aligning Learning Incentives Program in
Mexico
2.1 Introduction
Identication of peer eects (PEs) faces multiple challenges such as endogenous peer
selection, simultaneity of outcomes, and the presence of correlated eects within peer
groups. Despite these challenges, there is an extensive body of literature that estimates
PEs by implementing dierent methods aimed at minimizing potential biases. There is,
however, wide variation in the sign and magnitude of the estimated PEs, even among
papers that use strong identication strategies. On one side, one can argue that such vari-
ation responds to the particular method used, which in turn might depend on the available
data and the context. On the other side, one can also argue that the lack of consistency
across estimates of PEs not only makes it dicult to pin down a reliable measure, but also
brings into question whether PEs actually do exist.
In this paper, I use an experiment in Mexican high schools to analyze how estimates
of PEs change under dierent types of monetary incentives aimed at increasing math
achievement. Although the experiment was not designed to measure PEs, some of the
treatments have the potential to enhance the inuence that peers can have on each other.
66
67
I nd that the estimated PEs dier between incentivized and non-incentivized groups,
and across incentivized groups. Based on this nding, I argue that changes in the impact
of classroom peers’ ability (measured by their individual xed eects) resulting from the
experimental intervention should be interpreted as evidence of PEs. The argument is as
follows.
In the Fall of 2008, 88 Mexican Federal high schools (grades 10 to 12) were randomly
assigned into three dierent treatment groups through the Aligning Learning Incentives
Program (ALI). ALI was designed to promote math achievement through performance-
based monetary incentives. The ALI groups are:
1. Treatment one (T1) with individual incentives to students only;
2. Treatment two (T2) with individual incentives to teachers only;
3. Treatment three (T3) with both individual and group incentives to students, teach-
ers and school administrators, thus rewarding higher interactions among all the
educational actors in the school; and
4. Control group (C) with no incentives.
The incentives’ program lasted for three years, ending in the Spring of 2011. Program
impact estimates (Behrman, Parker, Todd, and Wolpin (2015)) reveal that (i) students in
T1 schools increased math test scores by 0.2-0.3 of a standard deviation, depending on
the grade and year; (ii) incentives in T2 schools did not aect test scores; (iii) students
in T3 schools showed the largest impacts, increasing test scores by 0.3-0.6 of a standard
deviation.
The challenges faced when attempting to identify PEs are present whether students
are randomly assigned into classrooms or not, but nonrandom assignment makes identi-
cation more dicult. Because ALI was not intended to explicitly measure PEs, students
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were not randomly assigned into classrooms, but into treatment/control groups at the
school level. A proposed method in the presence of endogenous peer selection, which is
the method I use in this paper, is developed in Arcidiacono et al. (2012). The key inno-
vation is to allow the PEs to operate through the xed eects of a student’s peers. The
only data requirements are multiple outcomes per student and heterogeneity in the peer
group over time.
Additionally, as in Burke and Sass (2013), I can also control for the xed inputs of
teachers and schools, hence limiting the scope for biases from endogenous selection of
peers, teachers and schools. Using this xed eects approach, I provide a measure of PEs
for each of the treatment groups and for the control group. The success of my estimation
rests on the same two assumptions as in Arcidiacono et al. (2012): outcomes are linear in
peer characteristics, and the eect of peer characteristics is proportional to that of own
characteristics. It also rests on the assumption that peers inuence each other’s outcomes
(the ALI standardized test score) only through their (xed) ability or aptitude and not also
through their test scores or variable eort.
While xed eects alleviate bias associated with sorting on time-invariant student and
teacher characteristics, they cannot control for classroom assignment policies that depend
on unobserved, time-varying factors. For example, if students who have an unusually high
test score in one year are systematically assigned to high quality peers the following year
and then in that year fall back toward their typical achievement level (a case of mean
reversion), estimates of the eect of the second year peers on student achievement would
likely be biased downward. A similar downward bias would likely arise if a positive shock
in one year results in a student being assigned to a high quality teacher in the second year
and student’s achievement mean reverts (Burke and Sass, 2013). Hence, my estimate of
PEs may still be subject to bias.
Given the experimental design of ALI, there is no reason to believe that the potential
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bias associated with unobserved, time-varying characteristics is dierent between incen-
tivized and non-incentivized groups. Nevertheless, in arguing that dierences in the es-
timated PEs across ALI groups can be interpreted as evidence of PEs, we need to think
about the ways in which the incentive schemes can aect the inuence that peer (xed)
ability can have on own achievement. The easiest treatment to begin with is T2. Because
incentives in T2 schools did not aect test scores, there should not be any dierence be-
tween the estimated PEs in T2 and C schools, irrespective of whether the estimates are
biased or not.
A dierent story can be happening within T1 schools. In this case, students have an
explicit incentive to do better, and PEs might be enhanced if we believe, for example, that
students tend to behave in ways similar to the rest of the group. Hence, we might expect
the estimated PEs to be higher in T1 schools relative to C schools. However, my measure
of peer ability can capture true ability with considerable error if, for example, a xed
peer characteristic like gender matters a great deal and this characteristic is uncorrelated
with ability. If this is the case, and students are also systematically assigned to groups
in response to the incentives, then the estimated PEs can be substantially overestimated
(Angrist, 2014; Feld and Zolitz, 2015). In consequence, dierences in the estimated PEs
between T1 and C schools might be a reection of this upward bias.
The key element to argue that PEs inside the classroom are present, is given by dif-
ferences between T3 and T1 schools. There are two channels through which PEs can be
enhanced in T3 schools. As in T1, students have a direct incentive to do better individu-
ally, but they also have an incentive to help increase the achievement of their classmates,
as the nal payment is a function of both individual and group achievement. It is rea-
sonable to believe then that the estimated PEs would be higher in T3 schools relative to C
schools. Under the same argument made for T1 schools, there is a potential upward bias in
the PEs estimates for T3, but the sources of the bias should be the same, i.e. measurement
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error and systematic assignment to groups in response to the incentives. Hence, changes
in the impact of classroom peers’ ability between T3 and T1 schools can be ultimately
interpreted as evidence of peer eects.
My results suggest that peer eects inside the classroom, as measured by the xed
eects of a student’s peers, are positive and statistically signicant. In line with my story,
my three main results are the following:
(1) Although the estimated PEs are higher in T2 schools relative to C schools, the dif-
ference is not statistically dierent from zero;
(2) The estimated PEs in T1 schools is higher than in C schools (and the dierence is
statistically dierent from zero), but a potential upward bias cannot be completely
ruled out;
(3) T3 schools show the largest estimate of PEs, and this estimate is statistically higher
relative to both C and T1 schools, thus providing evidence of the existence of peer
eects.
2.2 The Aligning Learning Incentives Program (ALI)
The ALI program1 began in the 2008-2009 academic year and was in place for three years,
ending in the 2010-2011 academic year. In the experiment, 88 Mexican Federal high-
schools (grades 10 to 12) were randomized into three dierent treatment groups of 20
schools each, using the remaining 28 schools as controls. All students in each high-school
participated in the program in each of the three years.
The program provided monetary payments based on standardized curriculum-based
mathematic examinations in grades 10, 11 and 12 given at the end of each academic year.
1In this section I provide a summary of the ALI experiment, including its results, based on Behrman,
Parker, Todd and Wolpin (2015). The reader can refer to this document for details on sample selection, test
design, and the exact structure of the incentive payments.
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The ALI groups were:
1. Treatment Group 1 (T1). Payments to students based on their own performance.
2. Treatment Group 2 (T2). Payments to mathematics teachers based on the perfor-
mance of the students in their classes.
3. Treatment Group 3 (T3). Payments to students based on their own performance
and on the performance of the other students in their class. Payments to mathe-
matics teachers based on the performance of the students in their classes and on
the performance of the students in all other mathematics classes. Payments to non-
mathematics teachers and school administrators based on the performance of all
the students in the school.
4. Control Group (C). No payments.
Because admission to Mexican federal high-schools is determined on a competitive ba-
sis, the sample of schools was chosen to minimize distortions over students’ applications
decisions. Randomization was performed using a school-based block randomization de-
sign, with blocks dened over school size and the previous year’s graduation rate. Within
each block, schools were allocated at random to treatment groups. Cutos on school size
and graduation rates were chosen to have roughly similar numbers of schools within each
block.
Table 1 shows evidence of the quality of the randomization, comparing treatment and
control schools on aggregate school-level data and on the mean score of students on the
9th grade mathematics ENLACE. The latter is a national test with separate mathematics
and language components that is administered each year to all students between grades
3 and 9, and in grade 12, since 2006. As we can see, none of the variables in Table 1
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dier between the treatment and the control groups at conventional levels of statistical
signicance.
For the purpose of determining incentive payments, performance in the ALI test was
categorized into four levels: Pre-Basic, Basic, Procient and Advanced. The program’s
rewards are calculated relative to the change between the levels of performance at the
start of the grade and at the end of the grade, such that payments become progressively
larger recognizing that the eort necessary to improve from Pre-Basic to Procient, for
example, is likely to be greater than twice the eort in going from Pre-basic to Basic.
Table 2 shows the incentive payment schedule for students at each grade level that
serves as the basis for T1. Table 3 shows this incentive payment schedule for T2. In the
last case, mathematics teachers are punished if they take a student from a given level at
the start of the grade to a lower level at the end of the grade, with total teacher’s payment
bounded from below by zero. For T3, the students’ payments have two components. The
rst one (the individual component) was calculated exactly in the same way as in T1 using
the schedule in Table 2. The second one (the group component) was a xed proportion,
one percent, of the total payments earned by their classmates. The same components
apply for mathematics teachers: the individual component was calculated exactly in the
same way as in T2 according to the schedule in Table 3, while the group component was a
xed proportion, twenty-ve percent, of the payments earned by the other mathematics
teachers across all grade levels. Finally, non-mathematics teachers received a cash pay-
ment of twenty-ve percent of the mean mathematics teachers’ performance payment,
and school administrators received fty percent of the same mathematics teachers’ per-
formance payment.
Linking the total payment of students in T3 to their classmates’ performance rests
on the idea that there is a fundamental complementarity between a student’s own eort
and the eort of his classmates. A possible synergy arises in which the own eort is a
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pure externality that generates a positive climate of learning by the overall eort within
the classroom. A second synergy might arise when students actively help other students
motivated by the bonus payment based on class performance. The group component of the
mathematics teachers’ payment relies on the same idea of stimulating cooperation among
these teachers, while the payments to non-mathematics teachers recognize the value of
potential interactions among teachers from dierent disciplines. On the other hand, the
payments to school administrators recognize the importance of support services provided
by administrative personnel in fostering learning within the school.
In the rst year of the program, 10th grade students in T3 scored 0.314 standard de-
viations higher than C students, and T1 students 0.169 standard deviations higher. This
dierence between the T1 and the T3 treatment eects is statistically signicant at the
conventional levels. In year 2, these gures are 0.466 standard deviations for T3 and 0.291
standard deviations for T1, and this dierence in the treatment eect is again statistically
signicant. In the last year of the program the treatment eects are 0.634 standard devi-
ations for T3, 0.323 standard deviations for T1 and 0.135 standard deviations for T2 (the
only year in which the treatment eect for T2 is statistically signicant). The results for
11th and 12th grades follow the same tendency as those for 10th grade: the eects are
higher in years 2 and 3, of similar magnitude, larger for T3 than for T1, each precisely
estimated, statistically distinguishable, without discernible eect in T2.
2.3 The Data
There are ve dierent cohorts observed during the three years of the ALI program. Two
cohorts are observed only once, if they were in 12th grade in the rst year of ALI or in
10th grade in the last year of the program. Two more cohorts can be observed twice,
if they were in 11th grade in the rst year of ALI or 10th grade in the second year. A
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last cohort is observed three times, if they were in 10th grade in the rst year of the
program. Identication requires multiple outcomes per student, hence, those cohorts that
were observed only once as well as single observations in cohorts that can be observed
more than once are eliminated.
Because a student should be observed at least twice, attrition becomes particularly
important if dierences in the eect of classroom peers’ ability are inocrrectly attributed
to dierences in the incentive schemes. Table 4 includes the test completion rates for the
three cohorts that can be observed more than once. In almost all cases, a lower proportion
of students took the ALI test at least two times in the control schools, and students are
particularly more likely to take the test at the end of the year if they are the ones being
rewarded, either though treatment T1 or treatment T3. However, from the eighteen coef-
cients for all treatment groups, there are only three that are statistically dierent from
the control schools, two at the 10% level and one at the 5% level.
To capture as much variation in peer composition as possible, I restrict my analysis to
those students that are observed three times, and so took the ALI test at the end of each of
the three years of the program. The scores in the ALI test are normed by grade and year.
Information on the 9th grade ENLACE mathematics score is also used to classify stu-
dents according to their baseline achievement. As previously described, the ENLACE test
is a national examination with separate mathematics and language components that is ad-
ministered each year to all students between grades 3 and 9, and in grade 12, since 2006.
The results in the ENLACE test were actually the base to determine the incentive pay-
ments at the end of the rst year of the program. Again, in attributing dierences in the
eect of peers’ ability for dierent type of students to the dierent incentive schedules,
each student type across treatments must be similar to the controls at baseline. Table 5
shows the proportion of students in each category of the 9th grade ENLACE for the co-
horts that are observed at least twice. In only one out of 27 cases are students more likely
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to be in the Procient and Advanced level in T3 schools relative to the control group.
The ALI test was administered at the end of each academic year. However, the cur-
ricula in the schools of the ALI experiment is semester-based. This means that in one
academic year students might have two sets of classmates and two dierent mathematics’
teachers. Hence, when making reference to a student’s peers, I refer to the total number
of classmates that a student has over two semesters. In a similar fashion, when making
reference to a student’s mathematics teacher, I refer to the pair of teachers a student has
in one academic year.
Descriptive statistics from the nal sample (panel of students who took the test in the
three years of ALI) are given in Table 6. As we can see, consistent with the results of the
ALI program as described in Behrman et al. (2015), relative to the control group, mean
individual test scores over the three years of ALI are higher in T1, the same in T2 and even
higher in T3. Consequently, the mean peer test score follows the exact same pattern. I also
divide the sample using the test score distribution in the 9th grade mathematics ENLACE
score, dening low achievers as those students in the bottom quintile, middle achievers
as those students in quintiles two, three and four, and high achievers as those students
in the top quintile of this score distribution. Although the proportion of students in each
category is similar across treatment groups, it is still true that mean individual/peer scores
are higher in T1 and T3 relative to C, and the same in T2. However, these dierences in test
scores across groups seem to increase with the initial ranking. Although just descriptive,
this preliminary analysis might be an indication of potential heterogeneity in the mean
peer eect, a possibility that will be addressed below.
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2.4 Identication Strategy
According to Manski (1993) there are three main hypotheses that explain why individ-
uals belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly: (1) endogenous eects (the
propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the behavior of the group),
(2) exogenous eects (the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with
the exogenous characteristics of the group), and (3) correlated eects (individuals in the
same group tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteris-
tics). In the classroom context, there is an endogenous eect if, all else equal, individual
test scores tend to vary with the average achievement of the students in the current peer
group. There is an exogenous eect if this variation is related with the socio-economic
characteristics of the classroom peers, for example. There are correlated eects if students
in the same class tend to behave similarly because they have similar characteristics, like
the same family backgrounds, or because they are taught by the same teachers. Except
for a few studies, in most empirical applications there is no distinction between the en-
dogenous and the exogenous eect, while the correlated eects have been viewed as an
unfortunate complication to attempts to identify peer eects.
Identication of peer eects is, nonetheless, subject to three types of problems (Mof-
t, 2001): (1) the simultaneity problem, (2) the correlated unobservables problem, and (3)
the endogenous membership problem. Again, in the context of the classroom, the simul-
taneity problem arises when mean peer scores aect student’s score and vice versa. The
problem of correlated unobservables arises if there is some class-specic component of the
error term that varies across classes and that is correlated with the exogenous character-
istics of the individuals. This implies that peer eects may work through unobservables,
which can understate its relevance if these unobservables are the main channel through
which the peer eects operate. The endogenous membership problem can arise if stu-
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dents tend to locate where there are other students of the same type; the most common
case is high-ability students locating in classes with students of the same level of ability,
or students sorting into classes based on teachers’ characteristics.
Two main estimation strategies have been adopted to sort the identication problems
of peer eects. The rst one is random assignment of student to groups (controlled ex-
periment) or some sort of exogenous variation in class composition (natural experiment).
In the absence of either of these exogenous variations peer eects can be captured us-
ing student xed eects. The peer eects operate through the xed eects of a student’s
peers. The only data requirements are multiple outcomes per student and heterogeneity
in the peer group over time. The ALI data includes both set of variables, as well as data
on teachers and school administrators. Hence, as in Burke and Sass (2013), we can control
for the xed eects of students, teachers, and schools, which limit the scope for biases
from endogenous selection of peers, teachers and schools.
My model will use a combination of the methods and formulas developed in Arcidia-
cono et al. (2012) and Burke and Sass (2013) to attempt to identify peer eects in each ALI
group. LetYit be the ALI score of student i in year t . This score depends upon the student’s
observed and unobserved characteristics,Xit and εit , an average of a linear function of the
observed and unobserved characteristics of each student in his current classroom peer
group, an average of the observed and unobserved characteristics of each pair of teachers
h at school p, Zp
ht
and up
ht
, and a student i , year t , random disturbance, ϑit . Let Nct denote
the total number of individuals in class c , in year t , and Nct∼i denote the set of individuals
in Nct with student i removed. The basic specication can be written as
Yit = Xitβ1 + εitβ2 +
1
Nct − 1
∑
j∈Nct∼i
(
X jtγ1 + εjtγ2
)
+ Z
p
ht
ψ1 + u
p
ht ,l
ψ2 + ϑit (2.1)
Notice that I’m assuming, as in most of the peer eects literature, that the test score
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function is linear with separable inputs. When peer groups are chosen endogenously, the
parameter of interest, γ1, might be biased if there is correlation between εit and the sum of
observed peer characteristics. At the same time, γ2 is not estimable given that it captures
the peer inuence through unobservables. Additional assumptions have to be made in
order to both, identify the eect of peers and facilitate the computation of the model. One
of the critical assumptions in the Arcidiaciono et al. (2012) model −also used in Burke
and Sass (2014)− is that the marginal eect of a student’s classroom peers is a fraction
λ ∈ (0, 1) of the student’s own characteristics (observed and unobserved), that is, γ1 = λβ1
and γ2 = λβ2. Dene αit = Xitβ1 + εitβ2, and pipht = Z
p
ht
ψ1 + u
p
ht
ψ2 In addition, assume that
student, teacher and school characteristics are xed over time2, i.e. αit = αi , and pipht = pi
p
h
.
Then the above equation can be rewritten as
Yit = αi +
λ
Nct − 1
∑
j∈Nct∼i
αj + pi
p
h
+ ϑit (2.2)
Equation (1) implies that a student’s test score is a function of his own xed eect, plus the
mean of the xed eects of the other students in the classroom peer group, and teacher-
by-teacher-by-school xed eects3.
We are interested in the solution to the least squares problem
min
α ,λ,pi
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(
Yit − αi − λ
Nct − 1
∑
j∈Nct∼i
αj − piph
)2
(2.3)
However, minimizing this function in one step is infeasible if there is a large number
of students. The method proposed in Arcidiacono et al. (2012), although it imposes the
strong assumption of proportionality in the peer eects, facilitates the computation of the
2Assuming time invariance in student xed eects is a usual assumption at the high-school level, based
on the idea that at this stage changes in ability are not as important as in earlier stages of human de-
velopment. Teacher and school time invariant xed eects are used in this rst stage only to facilitate
computation of the model. However, in an extension of this paper I will include time-varying xed eects.
3Because teachers are not observed at multiple schools, the school xed eects are embedded in the
teacher-by-teacher xed eects
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model. Based on this method, Burke and Sass (2013) developed an approximate estimation
procedure that I will borrow in this paper. The estimation proceeds as follows:
1. Begin by making initial guesses for each of the student xed eects, αi , and the
teacher-by-teacher-by-school xed eects, pip
h
, denoted by α0i and pi
p0
h
.
2. Conditional on (α0i ,pip0h ), estimate the peer eects coecient, λˆ0.
3. Conditional on pip0
h
and λˆ0, update each student xed eect, renaming as α1i , using
the following approximation to the true rst-order condition for α
αi =
∑
t
(
Yit − λNct−1
∑
j∈Nct,l∼i αj − piph
)
T
4. Conditional on λˆ0 and α1i , update each teacher-by-teacher-by-school xed eect,
renaming as pip1
h
, according to the exact rst-order condition
pi
p
h
= Y¯
p
h
− (1 + λ)α¯p
h
where Y¯p
h
refers to the average test score across all students ever taught by the pair
of teachers h at school p, and α¯p
h
refers to the average xed eect among the same
set of students.
5. Conditional on α1i and pi
p1
h
, repeat steps 1 to 4 until all of the xed eects and coef-
cients converge to within the tolerance limit.
6. Compute standard errors by bootstrapping.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Potential biases in the estimated peer eects
As mentioned in the previous section, identication of peer eects (PEs) faces multiple
challenges. The estimation method used here, which I refer to as the xed eects ap-
proach, overcomes three barriers in the measurement of PEs, namely endogenous selec-
tion of peers, teachers and schools that are the result of observed and unobserved time-
invariant characteristics. It also overcomes the simultaneity or reection problem by al-
lowing peers to inuence each other’s outcomes (the ALI standardized test score) only
through their (xed) ability or aptitude and not also through their test scores or variable
eort. However, there are still two additional issues that can bias my estimates of PEs:
(1) sorting into classrooms that are the result of unobserved, time-varying factors, and (2)
measurement error in student’s ability.
The main argument in this paper is that dierences in the estimated PEs between in-
centivized and non-incentivized groups (and across incentivized groups) that are a result
of the ALI experiment should be interpreted as evidence of PEs. Although students in
the ALI groups were not randomly assigned into classrooms, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the two sources of bias described above are dierent among incentivized and
non-incentivized groups. Even if such dierences are the result of changes in the bias in
response to the incentives, dierences across incentivized groups can be ultimately used
as evidence of the existence of PEs.
The argument uses three facts that should be observed in the data based on the incen-
tive design and the program’s treatment eects. The rst fact is that, given that incentives
in T2 schools did not aect test scores, there should not be any dierence between the es-
timated PEs in T2 and C schools, irrespective of whether the estimates are biased or not.
A possible counterargument is that teachers in T2 schools have an incentive to recruit
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the best students, but two features of the ALI program make such sorting unlikely. On
one side, the incentive payment schedule was designed to avoid this undesirable outcome
(see Table 3). On the other side, the ALI treatments were implemented at the school level,
which means all teachers within T2 schools have the same incentive. A similar argument
applies if we believe teachers have an incentive to recruit any other particular type of
student.
The second fact is that incentives in T1 schools have the potential to enhance PEs. In
this case, students have a direct incentive to study harder and, if we believe that one of the
channels through which PEs operate is by students inside the same classroom behaving
in similar ways, the estimated PEs in T1 schools should be higher relative to C schools. In
this case, however, there is some sorting that can not be completely ruled-out. One possi-
bility is the best students sorting into the math classes with the best teachers, and teacher
ability being correlated with peer ability in a way that is not captured by the teacher and
student xed eects. Since the xed eects are likely to measure ability with error, this
potential systematic assignment of students to groups can substantially overestimate the
PEs (Angrist, 2014; Feld and Zolitz, 2015). In consequence, dierences in the estimated
PEs between T1 and C schools might be a reection of this upward bias.
The third and last fact is that incentives in T3 schools also have the potential to en-
hance PEs, and even more so than in T1 schools. There are two sources of this enhance-
ment: (i) as in T1 schools, students have a direct incentive to increase their own achieve-
ment; and (ii) students also have an incentive to help increase the achievement of their
classmates, as the nal payment is a function of both individual and group incentive. It is
reasonable to believe then that the estimated PEs would be higher in T3 schools relative
to C schools. The same source of sorting that is possible in T1 schools is present in T3
schools, i.e. the the best students potentially sorting into classes with the best teachers,
and teacher ability being correlated with peer ability in a way that xed eects cannot
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account for. Analogous to T1, this type of sorting in combination with measurement er-
ror in student ability can overestimate the PEs. However, there are no sources of bias that
should be dierent between T1 and T3 schools. Hence, changes in the impact of classroom
peers’ ability between T3 and T1 schools can be ultimately interpreted as evidence of PEs.
2.5.2 Evidence of peer eects
The estimation results based on the methods described in the previous section are shown
in Table 7. The coecients in this table represent the marginal eects ratio: the ratio of
the eect on grades from a one standard deviation increase in peer ability to the eect on
grades from a one standard deviation increase in own ability. The coecient in Column C,
for example, suggests that a one standard deviation increase in peer ability is equivalent
to a maximum of 8% of the eect of a one standard deviation increase in own ability when
there is no incentive payment.
In all cases the treatment increases the maximum eect of peer ability on own ability.
When only students are rewarded, the maximum eect increases to 29%; when only teach-
ers are rewarded, the maximum eect increases to 17%; and when payments are linked
to both individual and group performance, the maximum eect increases to 41%. How-
ever, relative to the control group, there is an increase in the eect of a student’s peers
only when students are rewarded, that is, providing incentives only to teachers does not
change the average maximum eect of peer ability on own ability.
The results in Table 7 correspond to the three facts that I believe should be observed
based on the incentive design of the ALI program:
(1) The estimated PEs in T2 schools are not dierent than in C schools. Although the
estimates are in magnitude higher in T2 schools relative to C schools, the dierence
in not statistically signicant at the conventional levels. Although the PEs estimates
in T2 and C schools (and in general in all groups) might still be subject to bias, they
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are not dierent from each other.
(2) The estimated PEs in T1 schools are higher than in C schools, and the dierence
is statistically signicant. However, as explained in the previous subsection, the
estimates in T2 schools can be substantially biased upwards, and this dierence
between T2 and C schools cannot be directly interpreted as evidence of PEs.
(3) The estimated PEs in T3 schools are higher than in C schools and T1 schools, and
both dierences are statistically signicant. As with T1, the dierence between T3
and C schools cannot be directly interpreted as evidence of PEs, but the dierence
between T3 and T1 schools can ultimately be used as evidence of the existence of
PEs, as the sources of upwards bias in T1 and T3 schools should be the same.
2.6 Conclusion
In an experiment in Mexico (the Aligning Learning Incentives program, ALI), 88 Federal
high-schools were randomly assigned into three dierent treatment groups to promote
mathematics achievement through performance-based monetary incentives. Treatment
one (T1) provides individual incentives to students only, and treatment two (T2) to teach-
ers only. Treatment three (T3) oers both individual and group incentives to students,
teachers and school administrators, thus rewarding higher interactions among all the ed-
ucational actors in the school. The results from this experiment show that rewarding
higher interactions between all the educational actors (T3) has a positive eect on stu-
dents’ achievement that is higher than rewarding only students (T1), while incentives to
teachers (T2) do not seem to aect test scores.
Using this experiment, I implement a xed eects approach (Arcidiacono et al. (2012);
Burke and Sass (2013)) to measure peer eects (PEs) in each of the treatment groups and
in the control group. The PEs operate thought the xed eects of a student peers. As
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outlined in Arcidiacono et al. (2012), this estimation technique provides an advancement
in the estimation of PEs, specially if we believe that the eects of a student peers are driven
by both observed and unobserved peer characteristics. However, estimation of PEs using
a xed eects approach is still subject to two sources of bias: (i) sorting of students into
classrooms on the base of unobserved, time-varying characteristics, and (ii) measurement
error in student ability.
In consequence, my estimates of PEs using the xed eects of a student peers can
be certainly subject to bias. Given the experimental design that I exploit in this paper,
there is not reason to believe that the sources of bias in the estimated PEs should be
dierent between incentivized and non-incentivized groups. Even if the incentives have
the potential to exacerbate the bias, dierences across treatment groups, and in particular
between T3 and T1, can be interpreted as evidence of peer eects.
PEs are very dicult to estimate because their identication faces multiple challenges.
This has made hard not only to provide reliable and consistent measures of PEs, but also
can bring into doubt whether PEs actually exist. I this paper, I nd that the estimated PEs
dier between incentivized and non-incentivized groups, and across incentivized groups.
Based on this nding, I argue that these dierences provide strongly suggestive evidence
that PEs inside the classroom do exist.
A limitation of my study is that it can not provide a measure of the magnitude of PEs
nor can provide a description of the channels through which PEs might operate. However,
it is informative of the potential of peers to aect individual achievement, which should
be taken into account when designing educational policies like school choice programs,
ability tracking within schools, and racial and economic desegregation.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Comparison of Treatment and Control ALI Schools
T11 T22 T33 C4
Number of Schools 20 20 20 28
Blocking Variables
Mean # of Students 632 609 550 582
(0.55) (0.72) (0.63) (0.77)
Mean Graduation Rate (percent) 60.40 56.20 57.90 58.30
(0.53) (0.51) (0.07) (0.74)
Non-blocking variables
% Oportunidades5 39.50 40.60 40.10 40.30
(0.90) (0.97) (0.97) (0.99)
Mean Class Size 41.00 39.00 35.70 35.80
(0.15) (0.41) (0.97) (0.42)
% Teachers with University Degree 79.40 81.70 84.80 82.30
(0.74) (0.16) (0.66) (0.67)
% New Directors 25.00 30.00 40.00 25.00
(1.00) (0.71) (0.29) (0.72)
Mean Distance to Nearest Federal 32.80 31.40 32.40 32.90
Upper Secondary School (km) (0.97) (0.81) (0.91) (0.99)
9th Grade ENLACE Mean Test Score6
10th Grade Class 519.60 512.60 522.60 515.90
(0.81) (0.68) (0.57) (0.86)
11th Grade Class 516.60 517.40 524.70 516.00
(0.96) (0.86) (0.47) (0.91)
% With ENLACE Score
10th Grade Class 88.70 88.80 86.80 90.60
(0.23) (0.44) (0.08) (0.30)
11th Grade Class 74.00 75.20 75.30 78.30
(0.25) (0.37) (0.39) (0.62)
1. p-value for test T1 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in parentheses.
2. p-value for test T2 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in parentheses.
3. p-value for test T3 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in parentheses.
4. p-value for test T1 = T2 = T3 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in parenthe-
ses.
5. Oportunidades is a conditional cash transfer program that provides payments for
school attendance to low-income families.
6. National mean is 500 with a standard deviation of 100.
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Table 2.2: Schedule of Incentive Payments (Pesos) for Student
Achievement
End of Grade
Pre-Basic Basic Procient Advanced
Start of Grade
10th Grade
Pre-Basic $0 $4,000 $9,000 $15,000
Basic $0 $2,500 $7,500 $13,500
Procient $0 $0 $6,000 $12,000
Advanced $0 $0 $4,500 $10,500
11th Grade
Pre-Basic $0 $4,000 $9,000 $15,000
Basic $0 $0 $7,500 $13,500
Procient $0 $0 $6,000 $12,000
Advanced $0 $0 $4,500 $10,500
12th Grade
Pre-Basic $0 $0 $5,000 $10,000
Basic $0 $0 $5,000 $10,000
Procient $0 $0 $5,000 $10,000
Advanced $0 $0 $5,000 $10,000
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Table 2.3: Schedule of Incentive Payments (Pesos) Per-
Student for Mathematics Teachers
End of Grade
Pre-Basic Basic Procient Advanced
Start of Grade
10th Grade
Pre-Basic $0 $200 $450 $750
Basic -$125 $125 $375 $675
Procient -$125 -$125 $300 $600
Advanced -$125 -$125 $225 $525
11th Grade
Pre-Basic $0 $200 $450 $750
Basic -$125 $0 $375 $675
Procient -$125 -$125 $300 $600
Advanced -$125 -$125 $225 $525
12th Grade
Pre-Basic $0 $0 $250 $500
Basic $0 $0 $250 $500
Procient $0 $0 $250 $500
Advanced $0 $0 $250 $500
88
Table 2.4: ALI Test Completion Rates
ALI Treatment Group
C T11 T22 T33
A. Group 1: 10th Grade, Year 1 Cohort
% Taking ALI Exam in Year 2, Given 77.8 82.4 77.5 81.3
Test Taken in Year 1 [0.058] [0.914] [0.155]
% Taking ALI Exam in Year 3, Given 68.1 71.5 66.9 70.6
Test Taken in Year 1 [0.240] [0.662] [0.355]
% Taking ALI Exam in Year 3, Given 82.1 83.7 81.9 84.1
Test Taken in Year 2 [0.545] [0.931] [0.376]
% Taking ALI Exam in Year 3, Given 83.5 85.0 82.9 85.1
Test Taken in Years 1 and 2 [0.533] [0.795] [0.466]
B. Group 2: 11th Grade, Year 1 Cohort
% Taking ALI Exam in Year 2, Given 81.1 85.3 83.2 87.5
Test Taken in Year 1 [0.251] [0.503] [0.037]
C. Group 3: 10th Grade, Year 2 Cohort
% Taking ALI Exam in Year 3, Given 77.5 81.2 77.5 79.1
Test Taken in Year 2 [0.083] [0.969] [0.384]
1. p-value for test T1 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in brackets.
2. p-value for test T2 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in brackets.
3. p-value for test T3 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in brackets.
89
Table 2.5: Distribution of Students by 9th Grade ENLACE Results
ALI Treatment Group
C T11 T22 T33
A. Group 1: 10th Grade, Year 1 Cohort
Mean Test Score 535.3 541.2 533.2 547.9
[0.656] [0.808] [0.282]
% Pre-Basic 48.9 46.9 47.9 43.8
[0.679] [0.787] [0.290]
% Basic 40.3 39.9 43.3 42.3
[0.879] [0.246] [0.509]
% Procient and Advanced 10.9 13.3 8.9 13.9
[0.448] [0.266] [0.213]
B. Group 2: 11th Grade, Year 1 Cohort
Mean Test Score 524.9 523.8 525.5 534.3
[0.926] [0.953] [0.420]
% Pre-Basic 51.0 51.4 50.2 46.9
[0.921] [0.875] [0.418]
% Basic 43.7 42.4 44.9 45.1
[0.724] [0.772] [0.712]
% Procient and Advanced 5.4 6.2 4.9 8.1
[0.690] [0.537] [0.119]
C. Group 3: 10th Grade, Year 2 Cohort
Mean Test Score 533.8 541.1 535.3 541.2
[0.446] [0.871] [0.472]
% Pre-Basic 47.4 44.2 46.8 42.8
[0.448] [0.874] [0.274]
% Basic 42.9 42.5 42.3 42.8
[0.878] [0.843] [0.969]
% Procient and Advanced 9.7 13.4 10.9 14.5
[0.152] [0.524] [0.063]
1. p-value for test T1 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in brackets.
2. p-value for test T2 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in brackets.
3. p-value for test T3 = C (corrected for school-level clustering) in brackets.
4. National mean is 500 and standard deviation is 100.
5. Sample are students who took the test in each possible year of the program (non-attriters).
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics for the Selected Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
ALI-individual’s test score
T1 42.72 13.17 0 98.44 8,975
T2 38.41 11.45 0 87.80 7,617
T3 45.08 14.04 0 92.31 7,343
C 38.29 11.32 0 90.50 10,623
ALI-peers’ test score
T1 37.31 8.63 4.05 74.16 8,975
T2 32.51 6.51 4.91 49.38 7,617
T3 39.89 9.02 14.95 76.88 7,343
C 32.56 5.95 7.01 49.59 10,623
Proportion Individual Peers
(pre-ALI) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Low-achievers
T1 0.20 34.48 7.65 33.89 7.02
T2 0.19 31.71 6.62 30.39 6.72
T3 0.19 36.77 9.66 36.10 8.48
C 0.20 31.55 6.15 31.08 5.58
Mid-achievers
T1 0.60 41.71 9.17 36.81 7.78
T2 0.62 37.94 7.88 32.90 6.23
T3 0.58 44.05 10.14 39.79 8.83
C 0.62 37.63 7.62 32.64 5.87
High-achievers
T1 0.20 53.96 10.62 41.81 9.44
T2 0.18 48.63 9.50 34.84 6.18
T3 0.23 55.31 10.24 44.03 8.33
C 0.19 48.35 9.77 34.43 5.95
1. Sample includes students who took the test in each possible year of ALI, i.e. 10th graders in the
rst year of the program.
2. Low achievers are students in the bottom quintile of the 9th grade ENLACE distribution. Middle
achievers are students in quintiles two, three and four, and high achievers are students in the
top quintile of 9th grade ENLACE distribution.
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Table 2.7: Peer Eects Estimates by Treatment Group
ALI Treatment Group
T1 T2 T3 C
Mean Peer Fixed Eect 0.2937∗∗∗ 0.1730∗∗∗ 0.4070∗∗∗ 0.0844∗
(0.0529) (0.0502) (0.0531) (0.0497)
p−value: TJ = C, J = 1,2,3 0.0039 0.2094 <.0001
p−value: T3 > T1 0.0651
Observations 8,975 7,617 7,343 10,623
1. ∗Signicant at 10%, ∗∗Signicant at 5%, ∗∗∗Signicant at 1%.
2. Model includes teacher-by-teacher-by-school xed eects, school administrators
xed eects, grade-level xed eects, academic year xed eects and state xed
eects.
3. Coecients represent the marginal eects ratio: the ratio of the eect on grades
from a one standard deviation increase in peer ability to the eect on grades from a
one standard deviation increase in own ability.
4. Standard errors, in parenthesis, clustered at the school-level and based on 200 boot-
strap replications.
92
Chapter 3
probitfe and logitfe: Bias corrections for
probit and logit models with two-way xed
eects
Coauthored with Ivan Fernandez-Val (Department of Economics, Boston University) andMar-
tin Weidner (Department of Economics, University College London)
3.1 Introduction
Panel data, consisting of multiple observations over time for a set of individuals, are com-
monly used in empirical analysis to control for unobserved individual and time hetero-
geneity. This is often done by adding individual and time eects to the model and treat
these unobserved eects as parameter to be estimated in the so-called xed eect ap-
proach. However, xed eect estimators of nonlinear models such as binary response
models suer from the incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948). A special
case is the logit model with individual eects where one can use the conditional likeli-
hood approach (Rasch, 1960; Andersen, 1973; Chamberlain, 1984), implemented in clogit
and xtlogit. This approach provides estimates of model coecients, but is not available
for the probit model, and also does not produce estimates of average partial or marginal
eects, which are often the quantities of interest in binary response models. Moreover,
clogit and xtlogit do not work well when the panel is long and the model also includes
time eects, because the estimation of the time eects introduces additional incidental pa-
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rameter bias. Time eects are routinely used in empirical analysis to control for aggregate
common shocks and to parsimoniously account for cross sectional dependence.
We deal with the incidental parameter problem by using the bias corrections recently
developed by Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) for nonlinear panel models with two-
way xed eects. These corrections apply to panel datasets or other pseudo-panel data
structures where the two dimensions (N and T ) are moderately large; see Arellano and
Hahn (2007) for a survey on bias correction methods to deal with the incidental parameter
problem. Examples of moderately long panel datasets include traditional microeconomic
panel surveys with a long history of data such as the PSID and NLSY, international cross-
country panels such as the PennWorld Table, U.S. state level panels over time such as
the CPS, and square pseudo-panels of trade ows across countries such as the Feenstra’s
World Trade Flows and CEPII, where the indices correspond to the same countries indexed
as importers and exporters. The commands probitfe and logitfe implement analytical
and jackknife corrections for xed eect estimators of logit and probit models with in-
dividual and/or time eects. They produce corrected estimates of the model coecients
and average partial eects. To the best of our knowledge, these are the rst commands in
Stata to implement bias correction methods for nonlinear panel models.
The ado and help les for the commands probitfe and logitfe are available through
the Statistical Software Components of the Department of Economics of Boston Col-
lege at http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s458279.htm and http:
//econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s458278.htm.
Notation. The symbols→P and→d are used to denote convergence in probability and
distribution, respectively.
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Outline. The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the pro-
bit and logit panel models, the incidental parameter problem, and the bias corrections
of Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016). Section 3 presents the commands’ features. Sec-
tion 4 provides an illustrative empirical application on international trade ows across
countries, together with the results of a Monte Carlo simulation calibrated to the appli-
cation. We refer the interested reader to Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) for details on
the assumptions, asymptotic theory and proofs of all the results presented in Section 2.
3.2 Probit and Logit Models with Two-Way Fixed Eects
3.2.1 Models and Estimators
We observe a binary response variable Yit ∈ {0, 1} together with a vector of covariates
Xit for individual i = 1, . . . ,N at time t = 1, . . . ,T . This denition of the indices i and t
applies to standard panel datasets. More generally, i and t can specify any group structure
in the data. For example, in the empirical application of Section 4, i and t index the same
countries as importers and exporters, respectively. The logit and probit models specify
the probability of Yit = 1 conditional on current and past values of the regressors X ti =
(Xi1, . . . ,Xit ), unobserved individual specic eects α = (α1, . . . ,αN ), and unobserved
time specic eects γ = (γ1, . . . ,γT ), namely
Pr
(
Yit = 1 | X ti ,α ,γ , β
)
= F (X ′itβ + αi + γt ),
where F : R→ [0, 1] is a cumulative distribution function (the standard normal distribu-
tion in the probit model and the standard logistic distribution in the logit model), and β
is a vector of unknown model coecients of the same dimension as Xit . The vector Xit
contains predetermined variables with respect to Yit . In particular, Xit can include lags of
Yit to accommodate dynamic models. In some static models or in panels where t does not
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index time, Xit can be treated as strictly exogenous with respect to Yit by replacing X ti by
Xi = (Xi1, . . . ,XiT ) in the conditioning set. The model does not impose any restriction on
the relation between the covariate vector and the unobserved eects. In empirical appli-
cations the conditioning on the unobserved eects serves to control for endogeneity as
the individual and time eects capture unobserved heterogeneity that can be related to
the covariates.
We adopt a xed eect approach and treat the individual and time eects as parameters
to be estimated. We denote by β0, α0 and γ 0 the true values of the parameters, that is, the
parameters that are assumed to generate the distribution ofYit according the model above.
The (conditional) log-likelihood function of the observation (i, t) is
`it (β ,αi ,γt ) := Yit × log
[
F (X ′itβ + αi + γt )
]
+ (1 − Yit ) × log
[
1 − F (X ′itβ + αi + γt )
]
,
and the xed eect estimators for β , α andγ are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood
function of the sample, (
β̂ , α̂ , γ̂
)
∈ argmax
(β,α ,γ )∈Rdim β+N+T
∑
i,t
`it (β,αi ,γt ). (3.1)
This is a smooth concave maximization program for the logit and probit models. However,
there is a perfect collinearity problem because the log-likelihood function is invariant to
the transformation αi 7→ αi + c and γt 7→ γt − c for any c ∈ R. If Xit includes a constant
term, we overcome this problem by dropping α1 and γ1, which normalizes α1 = 0 and
γ1 = 0. If Xit does not include a constant term, we only need to drop either α1 or γ1. As in
linear panel models, the covariates Xit , other than the constant term, need to vary both
across i and over t to avoid further perfect collinearity problems, that is, to guarantee that
the log-likelihood function is strictly concave.
The above xed eect estimators can be implemented in Stata by using the existing
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logit and probit commands including individual and time binary indicators to account
for αi and γt . However, as we will explain in the next subsection, the xed eect estimator
β̂ can be severely biased, and the existing routines do not incorporate any bias correction
method.
In many applications of the logit and probit models the ultimate parameters of interest
are average partial eects (APEs) of the covariates, which take the form
δ 0 = E[∆(β0,α0,γ 0)], ∆(β ,α ,γ ) = (NT )−1
∑
i,t
∆(Xit , β ,αi ,γt ), (3.2)
where E denotes the expectation with respect to the joint distribution of the data and the
unobserved eects. The expression of the partial eect function ∆(Xit , β ,αi ,γt ) depends
on the type of covariate. If Xit ,k , the k th element of Xit , is binary, then its partial eect on
the conditional probability of Yit is calculated using
∆(Xit , β ,αi ,γt ) = F (βk + X ′it ,−kβ−k + αi + γt ) − F (X ′it ,−kβ−k + αi + γt ),
where βk is the k th element of β , and Xit ,−k and β−k include all elements of Xit and β
except for the k th element. This partial eect measures the impact of changing Xit ,k from
0 to 1 on the conditional probability of Yit = 1 holding the rest of the covariates xed at
their observed values Xit ,−k . If Xit ,k is not binary, then the partial eect of Xit ,k on the
conditional probability of Yit is calculated using
∆(Xit , β ,αi ,γt ) = βk∂F (X ′itβ + αi + γt ),
where ∂F is the derivative of F . This partial eect measures the impact of a marginal
change in Xit ,k on the probability of Yit = 1 conditional on the observed value of the
covariates Xit .
The xed eect estimator of APEs is obtained by plugging-in estimators of the model
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parameters in the sample analog of equation (3.2), that is,
δ˜ = ∆(β˜ , α˜ , γ˜ ),
where β˜ is an estimator for β , and
(α˜ , γ˜ ) ∈ argmax
(α ,γ )∈RN+T
∑
i,t
`it (β˜,αi ,γt ).
For example, if β˜ = β̂ then (α˜ , γ˜ ) = (α̂ , γ̂ ), where (β̂, α̂ , γ̂ ) is the xed eect estimator
dened in (3.1). Again, there are Stata routines to calculate δ˜ , but they do not implement
any bias correction.
3.2.2 Incidental Parameter Problem
The xed eect estimators β̂ and δ˜ suer from the Neyman and Scott incidental parame-
ter problem. In particular, these estimators are inconsistent under asymptotic sequences
whereT is xed as N →∞ when the model has individual eects, or where N is xed as
T →∞ when the model has time eects. The source of the problem is that there is only a
xed number of observations to estimate each unobserved eect,T observations for each
individual eect or N observations for each time eect, rendering the corresponding es-
timators inconsistent. The nonlinearity of the model propagates the inconsistency in the
estimation of the individual or time eects to all the model coecients and APEs.
A recent response to the incidental parameter problem is to consider an alternative
asymptotic approximation where N → ∞ and T → ∞ (e.g., Arellano and Hahn, 2007).
The key insight of this so-called large-T panel data literature is that under this approxi-
mation the incidental parameter problem becomes a bias problem that is easier to handle
than the inconsistency problem under the traditional asymptotic approximation. In par-
ticular, Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) show that as N ,T → ∞, with N /T → c > 0,
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the limit distribution of β̂ is described by
√
NT (β̂ − β0 − Bβ/T − Dβ/N ) →d N(0,V β ),
where V β is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix, Bβ is an asymptotic bias term
coming from the estimation of the individual eects, and Dβ is an asymptotic bias term
coming from the estimation of the time eects.1 The nite sample prediction of this result
is that the xed eect estimator can have signicant bias relative to its dispersion even
if N and T are of the same order. Moreover, condence intervals constructed around the
xed eect estimator can severely undercover the true value of the parameter even in
large samples. We show that this large-N large-T version of the incidental parameters
problem provides a good approximation to the nite sample behavior of the xed eect
estimator through simulation examples in Section 4.
For δ˜ the situation is dierent, because the order of the standard derviation of δ˜ ,
1/√N + 1/√T , is slower than the order of the standard deviation of β̂ , 1/√NT . In this
case, Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) show that as N ,T → ∞, with N /T → c > 0, the
limit distribution is
√
min(N ,T )(δ˜ − δ 0 − Bδ/T − Dδ/N ) →d N(0,V δ ),
whereV δ is the asymptotic variance, Bδ is the asymptotic bias coming from the estimation
of the individual eects, andDδ is the asymptotic bias term coming from the estimation of
the time eects.2 Here the standard deviation dominates both of the bias terms, implying
that δ˜ is asymptotically rst order unbiased. The biases can nevertheless be signicant in
small samples as we show in Section 4 through simulation examples.
1The expressions of V β , Bβ , and Dβ for probit and logit models are given in the Appendix.
2The expressions of V δ , Bδ , and Dδ for probit and logit models are given in the Appendix.
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3.2.3 Analytical Bias Correction
The analytical bias correction consists of removing estimates of the leading terms of the
bias from the xed eect estimator of β . Let B̂β and D̂β be consistent estimators of Bβ and
Dβ , i.e. B̂β →P Bβ and D̂β →P Dβ as N ,T → ∞. The bias corrected estimator can be
formed as
β˜A = β̂ − B̂β/T − D̂β/N .
As N ,T →∞ with N /T → c > 0 the limit distribution of β˜A is
√
NT (β˜A − β0) →d N(0,V β ).
The analytical correction therefore centers the asymptotic distribution at the true value of
the parameter, without increasing asymptotic variance. This result predicts that in large
samples the corrected estimator has small bias relative to dispersion, the correction does
not increase dispersion, and the condence intervals constructed around the corrected
estimator have coverage probabilities close to the nominal levels. We show that these
predictions provide a good approximation to the behavior of the corrections in Section 4.
The bias corrected APEs can be constructed in the same fashion as
δ˜A = δ˜ − B̂δ/T − D̂δ/N ,
where B̂δ and D̂δ are consistent estimators of Bδ and Dδ , i.e. B̂δ →P Bδ and D̂δ →P Dδ as
N ,T →∞. The limit distribution of δ˜A is
√
min(N ,T )(δ˜A − δ 0 + oP (T −1 + N −1)) →d N(0,V δ ).
We give the details on how to compute B̂β , D̂β , B̂δ and D̂δ in the Appendix. The
probitfe and logitfe commands compute these analytical bias corrections with the op-
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tion analytical. When the regressorsXit are predetermined, e.g. when lagged dependent
variables are included, then the calculation of B̂β and B̂δ , and thus of the bias corrections,
requires the specication of a trimming parameter L ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} in order to estimate
a spectral expectation. For the asymptotic theory the requirement on L is that L → ∞
such that L/T → 0. In practice, we do not recommend to use L larger than four, and we
suggest to compute the analytical bias corrections for dierent values of L as a robustness
check. When the regressors Xit are strictly exogenous, then L should be set to zero. The
trimming parameter is set through the command options lags(integer), as described
below.
3.2.4 Jackknife Bias Correction
The commands probitfe and logitfe with the jackknife option allow for six dierent
types of jackknife corrections, denoted as ss1, ss2, js, sj, jj and double. We will briey
explain each correction and give some intuition about how they reduce bias. The jackknife
corrections do not require explicit estimation of the bias, but are computationally more
intensive as they involve solving multiple xed eect estimation programs. The meth-
ods are combinations of the leave-one-observation-out panel jackknife (PJ) of Hahn and
Newey (2004) and the split panel jackknife (SPJ) of Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) applied
to the two dimensions of the panel.
Let N = {1, . . . ,N } and T = {1, . . . ,T }. Dene the xed eect estimator of β in the
subpanel with cross sectional indices A ⊆ N and time series indices B ⊆ T as
β̂A,B ∈ argmax
β∈Rdim β
max
α(A)∈R |A |
max
γ (B)∈R |B |
∑
i∈A,t∈B
`it (β,αi ,γt ),
where α(A) = {αi : i ∈ A} and γ (B) = {γt : t ∈ B}. Notice that the original xed eect
estimator β̂ dened above is equal to β̂N,T. Using this notation we can now describe the
six jackknife corrections:
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• The correction ss1 applies simultaneously SPJ to both dimensions of the panel. Let
β˜N /2,T /2 be the average of the four split jackknife estimators that leave out half of
the individuals and half of the time periods, that is
β˜N /2,T /2 =
1
4
[
β̂{i : i≤dN /2e},{t : t≤dT /2e} + β̂{i : i≥bN /2+1c},{t : t≤dT /2e}
+ β̂{i : i≤dN /2e},{t : t≥bT /2+1c} + β̂{i : i≥bN /2+c},{t : t≥bT /2+1c}
]
,
where b.c and d.e denote the oor and ceiling function, respectively. The ss1 cor-
rected estimator is
β˜ss1 = 2β̂ − β˜N /2,T /2.
• The correction ss2 applies separately SPJ to both dimensions of the panel. Let β˜N ,T /2
be the average of the two split jackknife estimators that leave out the rst and sec-
ond halves of the time periods, and let β˜N /2,T be the average of the two split jackknife
estimators that leave out half of the individuals, that is,
β˜N ,T /2 =
1
2
[
β̂N,{t : t≤dT /2e} + β̂N,{t : t≥bT /2+1c}
]
,
β˜N /2,T =
1
2
[
β̂{i : i≤dN /2e},T + β̂{i : i≥bN /2+1c},T
]
.
The ss2 corrected estimator is
β˜ss2 = 3β̂ − β˜N ,T /2 − β˜N /2,T .
• The correction js applies PJ to the individual dimension and SPJ to the time dimen-
sion. Let β˜N ,T /2 be dened as above, and let β˜N−1,T be the average of the N jackknife
estimators that leave out one individual, that is,
β˜N−1,T =
1
N
N∑
i=1
β̂N\{i},T.
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The js corrected estimator is
β˜ js = (N + 1)β̂ − (N − 1)β˜N−1,T − β˜N ,T /2.
• The correction sj applies SPJ to the individual dimension and PJ to the time dimen-
sion. Let β˜N /2,T be dened as above, and let β˜N ,T−1 be the average of theT jackknife
estimators that leave out one time period, that is,
β˜N ,T−1 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
β̂N,T\{t} .
The sj corrected estimator is
β˜sj = (T + 1)β̂ − β˜N /2,T − (T − 1)β˜N ,T−1.
• The correction jj applies PJ to both the individual and the time dimension. Let
β˜N−1,T and β˜N ,T−1 be dened as above. The jj corrected estimator is
β˜ jj = (N +T − 1)β̂ − (N − 1)β˜N−1,T − (T − 1)β˜N ,T−1.
• The correction double uses PJ for observations with the same cross section and
time series indices. This type of correction only makes sense for panels where i
and t index the same entities. For example, in country trade data, the cross-section
dimension represents each country as an importer, and the “time-series dimension”
represents each country as an exporter. Thus, let N = T and dene β˜N−1,N−1 as the
average of the N jackknife estimators that leave one entity out, that is
β˜N−1,N−1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
β̂N\{i},N\{i} .
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The corrected estimator is
β˜double = N β̂ − (N − 1)β˜N−1,N−1.
To give some intuition on how these corrections reduce bias, we use a rst order
approximation to the bias
bias[β̂A,B] ≈ B̂β/|A| + D̂β/|B |,
where |A| denotes the cardinality of the setA. Consider for example the option ss1. Using
the previous approximation
bias[β˜ss1] ≈ 2 × bias[β̂N,T] − bias[β˜N /2,T /2] = 0,
because the leading bias of β˜N /2,T /2 is twice the leading bias in β̂N,T since the subpanels
used to construct β˜N /2,T /2 contain half of the individuals and time periods. In other words,
subtracting (β˜N /2,T /2−β̂N,T) from β̂ removes a nonparametric estimator of the leading bias.
Similarly, we can show that the leading bias of β̂ is removed by the other corrections as
they use appropriate choices of the size of the subpanels and corresponding coecients
in the linear combinations of the subpanel estimators.
There are panels for which there is no natural ordering of the observations along some
of the dimensions, e.g. the individuals in the PSID. In this case there are multiple ways to
select the subpanels to implement the ss1 and ss2 corrections. To avoid any arbitrariness
in the choice of subpanels, the command includes the possibility of constructing β˜N /2,T /2
and β˜N /2,T as the average of the estimators obtained from multiple orderings of the panels
by randomly permuting the indices of the dimension that has no natural ordering of the
observations. The option multiple(integer) allows the user to specify the number of
dierent permutations of the panel to use.
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Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) show that the correction ss2 removes the bias with-
out increasing dispersion in large samples. In particular, it is shown that the limit distri-
bution of β˜ss2 as N ,T →∞ with N /T → c > 0 is
√
NT (β˜ss2 − β0) →d N(0,V β ),
the same as the limit distribution of the analytical correction. The assumptions required
for this result include homogeneity conditions along the two dimensions of the panel to
guarantee that the bias terms Bβ and Dβ are the same in all the subpanels. The analytical
corrections described above do not require this type of conditions and are therefore more
widely applicable.
Jackknife corrections for the APEs are formed analogously. We compute estimates
δ˜A,B from subpanels with cross sectional indices A ⊆ N and time series indices B ⊆ T, and
use the corrections described above replacing β by δ everywhere.
3.2.5 One-Way Fixed Eects
So far we have focused on two-way xed eect models with individual and time eects
because they are the most commonly used in empirical applications. For completeness,
the commands probitfe and logitfe also provide functionality for one-way xed ef-
fect models that include only either individual eects or time eects (using the options
ieffects() and teffects(), respectively), as well as the exibility to choose whether
the bias corrections should account only either for individual eects or time eects (using
the options ibias() and tbias(), respectively).
Fixed eect estimators of these models also suer from the incidental parameter prob-
lem. The commands implement the analytical and jackknife corrections of Hahn and
Newey (2004) and Fernandez-Val (2009), and the split-panel correction of Dhaene and
Jochmans (2015). We do not describe these corrections in detail, because they are very
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similar to the ones described above for two-way models. For example, the analytical cor-
rection for β has the same form as β˜A after making one of the estimated bias terms equal
to zero: D̂β = 0 for models without time eects, and B̂β = 0 for models without individual
eects. We give the expressions of Bβ and Dβ and describe the jackknife corrections for
one-way xed eect models in the Appendix.
3.2.6 Unbalanced Panel Data
In the description of the incidental parameter problem and bias corrections, we implic-
itly assumed that the panel was balanced, i.e., we observe each individual, i = 1, . . . ,N ,
at each time period, t = 1, . . . ,T . Nevertheless, unbalanced panel datasets are common
in empirical applications. Unbalancedness does not introduce special theoretical com-
plications provided that the source of the missing observations is random. It does not
introduce complications in the computation either, because probitfe and logitfe make
use of Stata’s time-series operators that account for missing observations, provided the
data are declared to be time series.
Suppose, for example, that we have the following dataset:
tsset
panel variable: id (weakly balanced)
time variable: time, 1 to 7, but with gaps
delta: 1 unit
list id time
id time
1. 1 1
2. 1 2
3. 1 4
4. 1 5
5. 1 7
6. 2 2
7. 2 3
8. 2 5
9. 2 6
10. 2 7
106
which includes two individuals and seven time periods, but there is no observations
for every time period for each individual. Time-series operators are important when the
analytical correction is applied and the trimming parameter is higher than zero. If the
trimming parameter is equal to one, for example, probitfe and logitfe will correctly
produce a missing value for t = {1, 4, 7} for the rst individual, and for t = {2, 5} for the
second individual.
In the jackknife corrections, probitfe and logitfe identify the appropriate subset of
observations for each individual, because they use time as index instead of the observation
number. If we apply, for example, the jackknife bias correction ss1, where the subpanels
include half of the time periods for each individual, the commands will correctly use t =
{1, 2, 4} for the rst individual, and t = {2, 3} for the second individual.
3.3 The probitfe and logitfe commands
3.3.1 Syntax
Both probitfe and logitfe share the same syntax and options. We use here the syntax
for probitfe. The user only needs to replace logitfe in place of probitfe if she wishes
to t a logit model.
Uncorrected (NC) estimator
probitfe depvar indepvars
[
if
] [
in
] [
, nocorrection NC_options
]
Analytical-corrected (AC) estimator
probitfe depvar indepvars
[
if
] [
in
] [
, analytical AC_options
]
Jackknife-corrected (JC) estimator
probitfe depvar indepvars
[
if
] [
in
] [
, jackknife JC_options
]
Both, a panel variable and a time variable must be specied. indepvars may contain
factor variables. depvar and indepvars may contain time-series operators.
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3.3.2 Options for uncorrected (NC) estimator
Type of Included Eects
ieffects(string) species whether the uncorrected estimator includes individual eects.
ieffects(yes), the default, includes individual xed-eects.
ieffects(no) omits the individual xed-eects.
teffects(string) species whether the uncorrected estimator includes time eects.
teffects(yes), the default, includes time xed-eects.
teffects(no) omits the time xed-eects.3
Finite Population Correction
population(integer) adjusts the estimation of the variance of the APEs by a nite popu-
lation correction. Letm be the number of original observations included in probitfe,
and M ≥ m the number of observations for the entire population declared by the
user. The computation of the variance of the APEs is corrected by the factor f pc =
(M−m)/(M−1). The default is f pc = 1, corresponding to an innite population. Notice
that M makes reference to the total number of observations and not the total number
of individuals. If, for example, the population has 100 individuals followed over 10
time periods, the user must use population(1000) instead of population(100).
3.3.3 Options for analytical-corrected (AC) estimator
Trimming Parameter
lags(integer) species the value of the trimming parameter to estimate spectral expec-
tations, see the discussion in the Section 3.2.3 for details. The default is lags(0), that
is, the trimming parameter to estimate spectral expectations is set to zero. This option
should be used when the model is static with strictly exogenous regressors.
3ieffects(no) and teffects(no) is an invalid option.
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The trimming parameter can be set to any value between zero and (T −1). A trimming
parameter higher than zero should be used when the model is dynamic or some of the
regressors are weakly exogenous or predetermined. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, we
do not recommend to set the value of the trimming parameter to a value higher than
four.
Type of Included Eects
ieffects(string) species whether the model includes individual xed-eects.
ieffects(yes), the default, includes individual xed-eects.
ieffects(no) omits the individual xed-eects.
teffects(string) species whether the model includes time xed-eects.
teffects(yes), the default, includes time xed-eects.
teffects(no) omits the time xed-eects.4
Type of Correction
ibias(string) species whether the analytical correction accounts for individual eects.
ibias(yes), the default, corrects for the bias coming from the individual xed-eects.
ibias(no) omits the individual xed-eects analytical bias correction.
tbias(string) species whether the analytical correction accounts for time eects.
tbias(yes), the default, corrects for the bias coming from the time xed-eects.
tbias(no) omits the time xed-eects analytical bias correction.5
Finite Population Correction
population(integer) adjusts the estimation of the variance of the APEs by a nite popu-
lation correction. Letm be the number of original observations included in probitfe,
4ieffects(no) and teffects(no) is an invalid option.
5ibias(no) and tbias(no) is an invalid option.
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and M ≥ m the number of observations for the entire population declared by the
user. The computation of the variance of the APEs is corrected by the factor f pc =
(M−m)/(M−1). The default is f pc = 1, corresponding to an innite population. Notice
that M makes reference to the total number of observations and not the total number
of individuals. If, for example, the population has 100 individuals followed over 10
time periods, the user must use population(1000) instead of population(100).
3.3.4 Options for jackknife-corrected (JC) estimator
# of Partitions
ss1 species split panel jackknife in four non-overlapping sub-panels; in each sub-panel
half of the individuals and half of the time periods are left out. See previous section
for the details.
multiple(integer) is a ss1 sub-option that allows for dierent multiple partitions,
each one made on a randomization of the observations in the panel; the default is
zero, i.e. the partitions are made on the original order in the data set. If multiple(10)
is specied, for example, then the ss1 estimator is computed 10 times on 10 dierent
randomizations of the observations in the panel; the resulting estimator is the mean
of these 10 split panel jackknife corrections. This option can be used if there is a
dimension of the panel where there is no natural ordering of the observations.
individuals species the multiple partitions to be made only on the cross-sectional
dimension.
time species the multiple partitions to be made only on the time dimension.
If neither individuals nor time options are specied, the multiple partitions are
made on both the cross-sectional and the time dimensions.
ss2, the default, species split jackknife in both dimensions. As in ss1, there are four
sub-panels: in two of them half of the individuals are left out but all time periods are
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included; in the other two half of the time periods are left out but all the individuals
are included. See previous section for the details.
multiple(integer) is a ss2 sub-option that allows for dierent multiple partitions,
each one made on a randomization of the observations in the panel; the default is
zero, i.e. the partitions are made on the original order in the data set. If multiple(10)
is specied, for example, then the ss2 estimator is computed 10 times on 10 dierent
randomizations of the observations in the panel; the resulting estimator is the mean
of these 10 split panel jackknife corrections. This option can be used if there is a
dimension of the panel where there is no natural ordering of the observations.
individuals species the multiple partitions to be made only on the cross-sectional
dimension.
time species the multiple partitions to be made only on the time dimension.
If neither individuals nor time options are specied, the multiple partitions are
made on both the cross-sectional and the time dimensions.
js uses delete-one panel jackknife in the cross-section and split panel jackknife in the
time series. See previous section for the details.
sj uses split panel jackknife in the cross-section and delete-one jackknife in the time
series. See previous section for the details.
jj uses delete-one jackknife in both the cross-section and the time series. See previous
section for the details.
double uses delete-one jackknife for observations with the same cross-section and the
time-series indices. See previous section for the details.
Type of Included Eects
ieffects(string) species whether the model includes individual xed-eects.
ieffects(yes), the default, includes individual xed-eects.
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ieffects(no) omits the individual xed-eects.
teffects(string) species whether the model includes time xed-eects.
teffects(yes), the default, includes time xed-eects.
teffects(no) omits the time xed-eects.6
Type of Correction
ibias(string) species whether the jackknife correction accounts for the individual ef-
fects.
ibias(yes), the default, corrects for the bias coming from the individual xed-eects.
ibias(no) omits the individual xed-eects jackknife correction. If this option and
multiple partitions only in the time-dimension are specied togeteher (for the jack-
knife ss1/ss2 corrections), the resulting estimator is equivalent to the one without
multiple partitions.
tbias(string) species whether the jackknife correction accounts for the time eects.
tbias(yes), the default, corrects for the bias coming from the time xed-eects.
tbias(no) omits the time xed-eects jackknife correction. If this option and multiple
partitions only in the cross-section are specied togeteher (for the jackknife ss1/ss2
corrections), the resulting estimator is equivalent to the one without multiple parti-
tions7.
Finite Population Correction
population(integer) adjusts the estimation of the variance of the APEs by a nite popu-
lation correction. Letm be the number of original observations included in probitfe,
and M ≥ m the number of observations for the entire population declared by the
user. The computation of the variance of the APEs is corrected by the factor f pc =
6ieffects(no) and teffects(no) is an invalid option.
7ibias(no) and tbias(no) is an invalid option.
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(M−m)/(M−1). The default is f pc = 1, corresponding to an innite population. Notice
that M makes reference to the total number of observations and not the total number
of individuals. If, for example, the population has 100 individuals followed over 10
time periods, the user must use population(1000) instead of population(100).
3.3.5 Saved results
probitfe and logitfe save the following in e():
Scalars
e(N) number of observations
e(N_drop) number of observations dropped because of all positive or
all zero outcomes
e(N_group_drop) number of groups dropped because of all positive or all
zero outcomes
e(N_time_drop) number of time periods dropped because of all positive or
all zero outcomes
e(N_group) number of groups
e(T_min) smallest group size
e(T_avg) average group size
e(T_max) largest group size
e(k) number of parameters excluding individual and/or time
eects
e(df_m) model degrees of freedom
e(r2_p) pseudo R-squared
e(chi2) likelihood-ratio chi-squared model test
e(p) signicance of model test
e(rankV) rank of e(V)
e(rankV2) rank of e(V2)
e(ll) log-likelihood
e(ll_0) log-likelihood, constant-only model
e(fpc) nite population correction factor
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Macros
e(cmd) probitfe/logitfe
e(cmdline) command as typed
e(depvar) name of dependent variable
e(title) title in estimation output
e(title1) type of included eects
e(title2) type of correction
e(title3) trimming parameter or # of multiple partitions
e(chi2type) LR; type of model chi-squared test
e(properties) b V
e(id) name of cross-section variable
e(time) name of time variable
Matrices
e(b) coecient vector
e(b2) average partial eects
e(V) variance-covariance matrix of coecient vector
e(V2) variance-covariance matrix of average partial eects
Functions
e(sample) marks estimation sample
3.4 Bilateral Trade Flows Between Countries
3.4.1 Empirical Example
To illustrate the use of the bias corrections described in sections 2.4 and 2.5, we present an
empirical application to bilateral trade ows between countries using data from Helpman,
Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). The data set includes trade ows for 158 countries over the
period from 1970 to 1997, as well as country-level data on geography, institutions, and
culture (the variables used in the analysis are described below). We estimate probit and
logit models for the probability of positive trade between country pairs in 1986. The data
structure is a pseudo-panel where the two dimensions index countries, id as importers
and jd as exporters. There are 157 × 156 = 24,649 possible country pairs.8
8The original data set included 158 countries, but we dropped Congo because it did not export to any
country in 1986.
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For each country pair, the outcome variable tradeij is an indicator equal to one if
country i imports from country j, and equal to zero otherwise. We use j instead of t to
emphasize that the second dimension does not index time. The model specication is
based on the gravity equation of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) with various mea-
sures of trade barriers/enhancers as key determinants of international trade ows. We also
include the presence of bilateral trade in 1985 to account for possible state dependence in
trade decisions. Importer and exporter country xed eects control for unobserved coun-
try heterogeneity such as size, natural resources or trade openness. The probability that
country i imports from country j, conditional on the observed variables, Xij , the unob-
served importer xed eect, αi , and the unobserved exporter xed eect, γj , is modeled
as
Pr(tradeij = 1 | Xij ,αi ,γj) = F (X ′ijβ + αi + γj), (3.3)
where F (·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function for the probit model,
or the logistic distribution for the logit model.
The set of explanatory variables, Xij , includes:
1. ltradeij : a binary variable equal to one if country i imported from country j in
1985, equal to zero otherwise;
2. ldistij : the logarithm of the distance (in km) between country i and country j
capitals;
3. borderij : a binary variable equal to one if country i and country j share a common
physical boundary, equal to zero otherwise;
4. legalij : a binary variable equal to one if country i and country j share the same
legal origin (including civil law, common law, customary law, mixed or pluralistic
law, and religious law), equal to zero otherwise;
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5. languageij : a binary variable equal to one if country i and country j share the
same ocial language, equal to zero otherwise;
6. colonyij : a binary variable equal to one if country i ever colonized country j or
vice versa, equal to zero otherwise;
7. currencyij : a binary variable equal to one if country i and country j use the same
currency or if within the country pair money was interchangeable at a 1:1 exchange
rate for an extended period of time, equal to zero otherwise;
8. ftaij : a binary variable equal to one if country i and country j belong to a common
regional trade agreement, equal to zero otherwise;
9. islandsij : a binary variable equal to one if both country i and country j are
islands, equal to zero otherwise;
10. religionij : the sum of (% Protestants in country i × % Protestants in country j)
+ (% Catholics in country i × % Catholics in country j) + (% Muslims in country i ×
% Muslims in country j); and
11. landlockij : a binary variable equal to one if both country i and country j have
no coastline or direct access to sea, equal to zero otherwise.
The specication of Xij is the same as in Table I of Helpman et al. (2008), except that we
include ltradeij . Note that despite the inclusion of the lag dependent variable, Xij can
be treated as strictly exogenous, because none of the two dimensions of the panel indexes
time.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the results of the logit model and probit model, respectively.
In both tables, column (1) reports uncorrected xed eect estimates, column (2) reports
estimates of the analytical correction setting the trimming parameter equal to zero (an-0),
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and columns (3) to (5) show estimates of the ss2, jj and double jackknife corrections.
The double correction makes sense because both dimensions of the panel index the same
set of countries. Each table shows estimates of index coecients and APEs. The latter are
reported in brackets. We also include standard errors for the index coecients in column
(6), and standard errors for the APEs in columns (6) and (7). In the case of the APEs, the
standard errors in column (7) are adjusted by the nite population correction parameter
described in Section 3.2, using a population equal to the sample size (24,492). There is
only one set of standard errors because the standard errors for the uncorrected estimator
are consistent for the corrected estimators (see Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016)).
We focus on the results for the logit model. The conclusions from the probit model
are analogous, specially in terms of APEs, which, unlike index coecients, are compara-
ble across models. As shown in column (1), the probability that country i imports from
country j is higher if country i already imported from country j in the previous year
(ltrade), if the two countries are closer to each other (ldist), if they share the same lan-
guage (language), if they share the same currency (currency), if they belong to the same
regional free trade agreement (fta), if they are not islands (islands), or if they share
the same religion (religion). As in Helpman et al. (2008), the probability that country i
imports from country j decreases if both countries have a common land border (border),
which they attribute to the eect of territorial border conicts that suppress trade between
neighbors. These eects go in the same direction irrespective the type of correction used.
However, there are some dierences in the magnitudes of the eects produced by the
dierent estimators.
Comparing across columns, an-0, jk-jj and double produce very similar estimates
of index coecients and APEs, which are all within one standard error of each other.
The split-panel correction estimates of the index coecients and APEs of ldist, legal,
currency, and fta in column (3) are two or more standard errors away from the rest of the
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estimates in the same rows. We show in the next section that jk-ss2 is less accurate than
an-0 and double through a Monte Carlo simulation calibrated to this application. Relative
to the uncorrected estimates in column (1), the corrected estimates of the index coecient
of ltrade are more than one standard error lower. We attribute the similarity in the rest
of index coecients and APES between uncorrected and bias corrected estimates partly
to the large sample size (except for jk-ss2). Thus, we nd more signicant dierences in
the next section when we consider subpanels with less than 157 countries.
3.4.2 Calibrated Monte Carlo Simulations
To evaluate the performance of the bias corrections, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation
that mimics the empirical example described above. We focus on the logit model, leaving
the probit model for the online supplementary material. All the parameters are calibrated
to the data used in the previous section, and their values are set to the uncorrected xed
eect estimates from column (1) in Table 3.1. To speed up computation, we consider only
two explanatory variables in Xij : the presence of trade in the previous year (ltrade) and
the log distance between country pairs (ldist).
For all possible country pairs we rst construct the index
indexij = β̂1ltradeij + β̂2ldistij + α̂i + γ̂j ,
where β̂1 = 2.838, β̂2 = −0.839, and α̂i and γ̂j are the uncorrected estimates of the importer
and exporter xed eects (not reported in Table 3.1). Next, we generate a new trade
indicator for each country pair as
trade∗ij = 1 ·
{
indexij > ln
(
1
runiform(1, 1) − 1
)
︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
(∗)
}
,
where ln denotes the natural logarithm and runiform(1,1) generates a random number
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from the uniform distribution in (0, 1), such that (∗) corresponds to a random draw from
the standard logistic distribution.
We use the generated trade indicators to estimate the equation
Pr(trade∗ij = 1 | ltradeij ,ldistij ,αi ,γj) = F (β∗1ltradeij + β∗2ldistij + α∗i +γ ∗j ),
where F (·) is the logistic distribution, and ltrade and dist are the variables from the
original data set. We repeat this procedure in 500 simulations for ve dierent sample
sizes: N = 25, N = 50, N = 75, N = 100 and N = 157 (full sample). For each sample size
and simulation, we draw a random sample of N countries both as importers and exporters
without replacement, so that the number of observations is N × (N − 1).
Table 3.3 reports the result for the uncorrected estimator (FE), analytical correction set-
ting the trimming parameter equal to zero (AN-0), jackknife correction ss2 (JK-SS2), and
jackknife correction double (Double). We analyze the performance of these estimators in
terms of bias and inference accuracy of their asymptotic distribution for both index co-
ecients and APEs. In particular, we compute the biases (Bias), standard deviations (Std.
Dev.), and root mean squared errors (RMSE) of the estimators, together with the ratio of
average standard errors to the simulation standard deviations (SE/SD), and the empirical
coverages of condence intervals with 95% nominal level (p; .95). The variance of the
APEs is adjusted by the population(integer) option, with the population being equal to
the original sample size (24,492 observations). All the results are reported in percentage
of the true parameter value.
For the uncorrected estimators in Panel A, we observe in column (1) that there is
signicant bias in the index coecients. This bias decreases with the sample size, but it
is still larger than the standard deviation for the coecient of ltrade in the full sample.
Moreover, column (5) shows that condence intervals constructed around the uncorrected
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estimates suer from severe undercoverage for all the sample sizes. As in Fernandez-Val
and Weidner (2016), we nd very little bias in the APEs, despite the large bias in the index
coecients. In Panel B, we see that the analytical correction reduces substantially the
bias in the index coecients producing condence intervals with coverage close to their
nominal level for every sample size. This correction reduces standard deviation resulting
in a reduction of more than 50% in rmse for several sample sizes. The jackknife corrections
also reduce bias and generally improve coverage, but increase dispersion in small samples
and require of larger sample sizes than the analytical corrections to improve rmse over
the uncorrected estimator. The jackknife correction double performs very similarly to
the analytical correction except for the smallest sample size. The jackknife correction ss2
of the index coecient of ldist has higher rmse than the uncorrected estimator even
for the full sample size. Overall, the standard errors provide a good approximation to the
standard deviations of all the estimators of both the index coecients and APEs.
To sum up, Table 3.3 shows that the analytical correction substantially reduces the
bias of the uncorrected estimator, producing more accurate point and interval estimators
for all the sample sizes considered. The jackknife correction double performs similarly
to the analytical correction, except for the smallest sample size N = 25. The split panel
correction ss2 reduces bias, but at the cost of increasing dispersion for most sample sizes.
In this application ss2 is dominated by the other corrections uniformly across all the
sample sizes in terms of rmse. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence in
Table 3.1, where the uncorrected estimates of the index coecient of ltrade were more
than one standard error below the corrected estimates, the estimates of the APEs where
very similar for the uncorrected and corrected estimators except for ss2, and the jaccknife
correction ss2 produced estimates for ldist at odds with the other estimators.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
The commands probitfe and logitfe implement the analytical and jackknife bias cor-
rections of Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) for logit and probit models with two-way
xed eects. The commands compute estimators of both index coecients and APEs,
which are often the parameters of interest in these models. We also provide functionality
for models with one-way xed eects, oering an alternative to the commands clogit
and xtlogit that do not produce corrected estimates of APEs. Logit and probit models
are commonly used in empirical work, making the new commands a valuable addition to
the applied econometrician’s toolkit. Similar corrections can be implemented for other
nonlinear panel models such as tobit models for censored outcome variables. We leave
this extension to future research.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Fixed Eect Logit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FE AN-0 JK-SS2 JK-JJ Double Std. Error
ltrade 2.838 2.741 2.786 2.743 2.745 (0.058)
[0.325] [0.323] [0.349] [0.325] [0.326] (0.014) (0.008)
ldist -0.839 -0.819 -0.742 -0.812 -0.812 (0.044)
[-0.055] [-0.055] [-0.049] [-0.055] [-0.055] (0.004) (0.003)
border -0.571 -0.557 -0.493 -0.564 -0.573 (0.195)
[-0.037] [ -0.037] [-0.036] [-0.037] [-0.038] (0.012) (0.012)
legal 0.115 0.113 0.017 0.112 0.112 (0.062)
[0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.008] (0.004) (0.004)
language 0.368 0.358 0.385 0.354 0.352 (0.080)
[0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] (0.005) (0.005)
colony 0.492 0.435 -0.023 0.344 0.129 (0.633)
[0.034] [0.030] [0.002] [0.021] [0.004] (0.045) (0.045)
currency 0.984 0.961 2.464 1.009 1.079 (0.252)
[0.070] [0.070] [0.164] [0.071] [0.073] (0.020) (0.019)
fta 2.244 2.171 3.347 1.827 1.571 (0.657)
[0.178] [0.177] [0.285] [0.142] [0.118] (0.062) (0.061)
islands 0.406 0.395 0.393 0.396 0.396 (0.156)
[0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] (0.011) (0.011)
religion 0.244 0.239 0.238 0.240 0.245 (0.123)
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] (0.008) (0.008)
landlock 0.143 0.139 0.153 0.156 0.170 (0.221)
[0.010] [0.010] [0.014] [0.010] [0.011] (0.015) (0.015)
Obs. 24492 24492 24492 24492 24492
Notes: Average Partial Eects in brackets. FE denotes uncorrected xed eect estimator; AN-0
denotes analytical correction with 0 lags; JK-SS2 denotes split jackknife in both dimensions;
JK-JJ denotes delete-one jackknife in both dimensions; Double denotes delete-one jackknife
for observations with the same index in the cross-section and the time-series. For the Average
Partial Eects, the standard errors reported in Column (7) are adjusted by the nite population
correction parameter, using a population equal to the number of observations (24,492).
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Table 3.2: Fixed Eect Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FE AN-0 JK-SS2 JK-JJ Double Std. Error
ltrade 1.631 1.586 1.625 1.587 1.588 (0.031)
[0.343] [0.345] [0.371] [0.346] [0.347] (0.014) (0.009)
ldist -0.438 -0.426 -0.377 -0.423 -0.422 (0.023)
[-0.054] [-0.054] [-0.046] [-0.054] [-0.054] (0.004) (0.003)
border -0.273 -0.265 -0.208 -0.268 -0.273 (0.107)
[ -0.033] [ -0.033] [-0.029] [-0.033] [-0.034] (0.013) (0.012)
legal 0.059 0.057 0.011 0.056 0.056 (0.033)
[0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007] (0.004) (0.004)
language 0.203 0.198 0.215 0.196 0.196 (0.042)
[0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.025] [0.025] (0.005) (0.005)
colony 0.287 0.253 0.005 0.207 0.099 (0.356)
[0.037] [0.033] [0.006] [0.025] [0.008] (0.047) (0.047)
currency 0.529 0.515 1.340 0.537 0.568 (0.139)
[0.069] [0.070] [0.166] [0.070] [0.072] (0.020) (0.019)
fta 1.235 1.192 1.807 1.067 0.991 (0.340)
[0.180] [0.178] [0.281] [0.155] [0.143] (0.057) (0.057)
islands 0.194 0.187 0.203 0.188 0.188 (0.084)
[0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] (0.011) (0.011)
religion 0.134 0.132 0.133 0.133 0.135 (0.066)
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] (0.008) (0.008)
landlock 0.041 0.041 0.033 0.044 0.049 (0.119)
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] (0.015) (0.015)
Obs. 24492 24492 24492 24492 24492
Notes: Average Partial Eects in brackets. FE denotes uncorrected xed eect estimator; AN-0
denotes analytical correction with 0 lags; JK-SS2 denotes split jackknife in both dimensions;
JK-JJ denotes delete-one jackknife in both dimensions; Double denotes delete-one jackknife for
observations with the same index in the cross-section and the time-series. For the Average
Partial Eects, the standard errors reported in Column (7) are adjusted by the nite population
correction parameter, using a population equal to the number of observations (24,492).
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Appendix A
probitfe and logitfe: Bias corrections for
probit and logit models with two-way xed
eects
A.1 Assymptotics
A.1.1 Expressions of the asymptotic bias and variance
Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2016) show that the asymptotic bias and variance for β can
be expressed as
Bβ =W −1B, Dβ =W −1D, V β =W −1,
where
B = E
[
− 12N
N∑
i=1
∑T
t=1
{
Hit∂
2FitX˜it + 2
∑T
τ=t+1 Hit (Yit − Fit )ωiτ X˜iτ
}∑T
t=1ωit
]
,
D = E
[
− 12T
T∑
t=1
∑N
i=1 Hit∂
2FitX˜it∑N
i=1ωit
]
,
W = E
[
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ωitX˜itX˜
′
it
]
,
E := plimN ,T→∞, ωit = Hit∂Fit , Hit = ∂Fit/[Fit (1 − Fit )], ∂jGit := ∂jG(Z )|Z=X ′it β0+α0i +γ 0t for
any function G and j = 0, 1, 2, and X˜it is the residual of the population projection of Xit
on the space spanned by αi and γt under a metric weighted by ωit .
The expressions of the asymptotic bias terms for the APEs are dierent depending on
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whether the APEs are obtained from uncorrected or bias corrected estimators of β . The
commands probitfe and logitfe implement the corrections on APEs obtained from bias
corrected estimators of the parameters, that is, δ˜ is obtained using β˜ equal to the bias
corrected estimator β˜A dened below. The expressions for the leading bias terms of δ˜
then read
Bδ = E
[
1
2N
N∑
i=1
∑T
t=1{2
∑T
τ=t+1 Hit (Yit − Fit )ωiτ Ψ˜iτ + ∂α2i ∆it − ΨitHit∂2Fit }∑T
t=1ωit
]
,
Dδ = E
[
1
2T
T∑
t=1
∑N
i=1{∂α2i ∆it − ΨitHit∂2Fit }∑N
i=1ωit
]
,
whereΨit and Ψ˜it are the tted value and residual of the population regression of−∂pi∆it/ωit
on the space spanned by αi and γt under the metric given by ωit . If all the components
of Xit are strictly exogenous, the rst term of Bδ is zero. The asymptotic variance of the
estimators of δ is
V δ = E
{
r 2NT
N 2T 2
N∑
i=1
[
T∑
t ,τ=1
∆˜it ∆˜
′
iτ +
∑
j,i
T∑
t=1
∆˜it ∆˜
′
jt +
T∑
t=1
ΓitΓ
′
it
]}
,
where rNT =
√
NT /(N +T − 1), ∆˜it = ∆it−δ 0, Γit = (Dβ∆)′W −1∞ Hit (Yit−Fit )X˜it−ΨitHit (Yit−
Fit ), and
Dβ∆ = E
[
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∂αi∆itX˜it
]
.
A.1.2 Analytical Correction
The analytical corrections are implemented using plug-in estimators of the bias terms that
replace expectations by sample averages and true parameter values by xed eect estima-
tors. Thus, for any function of the data, unobserved eects and parameters дit (β,αi ,γt ),
let д̂it = дit (β̂ , α̂i , γ̂t ) denote the xed eect estimator of дit = дit (β0,α0i ,γ 0t ), e.g., F̂it =
F (X ′it β̂ + α̂i + γ̂t ) denotes the xed eect estimator of Fit = F (X ′itβ0 + α0i + γ 0t ). The com-
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mands probitfe and logitfe with the analytical option compute the correction for
β
β˜A = β̂ − Ŵ −1B̂/T − Ŵ −1D̂/N ,
where
B̂ = − 12N
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 Ĥit ∂
2F̂it
̂˜X it+2 ∑Lj=1[T /(T−j)]∑Tt=j+1 Ĥi,t−j (Yi,t−j−F̂i,t−j )ω̂it ̂˜X it∑T
t=1 ω̂it
,
D̂ = − 12T
T∑
t=1
∑N
i=1 Ĥit∂
2F̂it
̂˜X it∑N
i=1 ω̂it
,
Ŵ =
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ω̂it
̂˜X it ̂˜X ′it ,
ω̂it = Ĥit∂F̂it , ̂˜X it is the residual of the least squares projection ofXit on the space spanned
by the incidental parameters under a metric weighted by ω̂it , and L is a trimming param-
eter for estimation of spectral expectations such that L → ∞ and L/T → 0. The fac-
tor T /(T − j) is a degrees of freedom adjustment that rescales the time series averages
T −1
∑T
t=j+1 by the number of observations instead of by T .
Similarly, the analytical correction for δ is computed as
δ˜A = δ˜ − B̂δ/T − D̂δ/N ,
where
δ˜ = ∆(β˜A, α˜A, γ˜A),
(α˜A, γ˜A) ∈ argmax
(α ,γ )∈RN+T
∑
i,t
`it (β˜A,αi ,γt ),
B̂δ = 12N
∑N
i=1
2
∑L
j=1[T /(T−j)]
∑T
t=j+1 Ĥi,t−j (Yi,t−j−F̂i,t−j )ω̂it ̂˜Ψit+∑Tt=1{∂α2i ∆̂it−Ψ̂it Ĥit ∂2F̂it }∑T
t=1 ω̂it
,
D̂δ =
1
2T
T∑
t=1
∑N
i=1{∂α2i ∆̂it − Ψ̂itĤit∂2F̂it }∑N
i=1 ω̂it
.
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A.1.3 Standard Errors
The standard errors for all the estimators (uncorrected or corrected) of the k th component
of β are computed as √
Ŵ −1
kk
/(NT ), k = {1, ..., dim β},
where Ŵ −1
kk
is the (k,k)-element of the matrix Ŵ −1 dened above, which is based on the
uncorrected xed eect estimator β̂ . The standard errors for all the estimators of the APEs
are computed as
1
NT
{
N∑
i=1
[
aNT
T∑
t ,τ=1
̂˜∆it ̂˜∆′iτ + aNT T∑
t=1
∑
j,i
̂˜∆it ̂˜∆′jt + T∑
t=1
Γ̂it Γ̂
′
it
]}1/2
,
where ̂˜∆it = ∆̂it − δ˜ , Γ̂it = (Dβ ∆̂)′Ŵ −1Ĥit (Yit − F̂it )̂˜X it − Ψ̂itĤit (Yit − F̂it ), and
Dβ ∆̂ =
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∂αi ∆̂it
̂˜X it ,
The factor aNT is a nite population correction term,
aNT = (N0T0 − NT )/(N0T0 − 1),
where N0 and T0 are the population sizes of the 2 dimensions of the panel. For example,
aNT = 1 if at least one of the dimension has innite size in the population, and aNT = 0
if we observe the entire population. The correction only aects the rst two terms of the
variance because they come from using a sample mean to estimate a population mean,
whereas the third term is due to parameter estimation.
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A.1.4 One-Way Fixed Eect Models
In models that include only individual eects, all the expressions of the asymptotic bias
and variance are the same as for the two-way xed eect models except for
Dβ = 0, Dδ = 0, ∂jGit := ∂jG(Z )|Z=X ′it β0+α0i ,
and X˜it is the residual of the population projection ofXit on the space spanned by αi under
a metric weighted by ωit . Symmetrically, in models that include only time eects, all the
expressions of the asymptotic bias and variance are the same as for the two-way xed
eect models except for
Bβ = 0, Bδ = 0, ∂jGit := ∂jG(Z )|Z=X ′it β0+γ 0t ,
and X˜it is the residual of the population projection ofXit on the space spanned byγt under
a metric weighted by ωit .
We do not provide explicit expressions for the analytical bias corrections and standard
errors because they are analogous to the expressions given in Sections A.1.2 and A.1.3. For
the jackknife, in models that include only individual eects:
• The corrections ss1, ss2 and sj implement the SPJ of Dhaene and Jochmans that
applies SPJ to the individual dimension, that is
β˜ss1 = β˜ss2 = β˜sj = 2β̂ − β˜N ,T /2.
• The corrections js, jj, and double implement the jackknife correction of Hahn and
Newey that applies PJ to the individual dimension, that is
β˜ js = β˜ jj = β˜double = N β̂ − (N − 1)β˜N−1,T .
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Similarly, in models that include only time eects:
• The corrections ss1, ss2, and js implement the SPJ of Dhaene and Jochmans that
applies SPJ to the time dimension, that is
β˜ss1 = β˜ss2 = β˜ js = 2β̂ − β˜N /2,T .
• The corrections sj, jj and double implement the jackknife correction of Hahn and
Newey that applies PJ to the time dimension, that is
β˜sj = β˜ jj = β˜double = T β̂ − (T − 1)β˜N ,T−1.
References
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith, and P. Howitt (2005): “Competition
and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120,
701.
Andersen, E. B. (1973): Conditional inference and models for measuring, vol. 5, Mentalhy-
giejnisk forlag.
Anderson, J. E. and E. van Wincoop (2003): “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle,” American Economic Review, 93, 170–192.
Andrews, D. (1999): “Estimation When a Parameter is on a Boundary,” Econometrica, 67,
1341–1383.
Andrews, R. J., P. Jargowsky, and K. Kuhne (2012): “The Eects of Texas’s Targeted
Pre-Kindergarten Program on Academic Performance,” Working Paper 18598, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Arcidiacono, P., G. Foster, N. Goodpaster, and J. Kinsler (2012): “Estimating
spillovers using panel data, with an application to the classroom,” Quantitative Eco-
nomics, 3, 421–470.
Arellano, M. and S. Bonhomme (2009): “Robust priors in nonlinear panel data models,”
Econometrica, 77, 489–536.
Arellano, M. and J. Hahn (2005): “Understanding Bias In Nonlinear Panel Models: Some
Recent Developments,” Working Paper, 1–38.
——— (2006): “A Likelihood-Based Approximate Solution To The Incidental Parameter
Problem In Dynamic Nonlinear Models With Multiple Eects,” Working Paper, 1–49.
——— (2007): “Understanding bias in nonlinear panel models: Some recent developments,”
Econometric Society Monographs, 43, 381.
Babcock, P., K. Bedard, G. Charness, J. Hartman, and H. Royer (2011): “Letting Down
the Team? Evidence of Social Eects of Team Incentives,” NBER Working Papers 16687,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Bai, J. (2009): “Panel data models with interactive xed eects,” Econometrica.
131
132
——— (2013): “Fixed-Eects Dynamic Panel Models, a Factor Analytical Method,” Econo-
metrica, 81, 285–314.
Baker, M. (2011): “Innis Lecture: Universal early childhood interventions: what is the
evidence base?” The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d’Economique,
44, 1069–1105.
Baker, M., J. Gruber, and K. Milligan (2015): “Non-Cognitive Decits and Young Adult
Outcomes: The Long-Run Impacts of a Universal Child Care Program,” Working Paper
21571, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barnett, W. S. (1998): “Long-Term Cognitive and Academic Eects of Early Childhood
Education on Children in Poverty,” Preventive Medicine, 27, 204 – 207.
Barrett, G. and S. Donald (2003): “Consistent tests for stochastic dominance,” Econo-
metrica, 71, 71–104.
Behrman, J. R., S. W. Parker, P. E. Todd, and K. I. Wolpin (2015): “Aligning Learning
Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High
Schools,” Journal of Political Economy, 123, pp. 325–364.
——— (forthcoming): “Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results of
a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools,” Journal of Political Economy.
Bester, A. and C. Hansen (????): “A penalty function approach to bias reduction in non-
linear panel models with xed eects,” .
Bharadwaj, P., J. Eberhard, and C. A. Neilson (forthcoming): “Health at Birth, Parental
Investments, and Academic Outcomes,” Journal of Labor Economics.
Burger, K. (2010): “How does early childhood care and education aect cognitive devel-
opment? An international review of the eects of early interventions for children from
dierent social backgrounds,” Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 25, 140 – 165.
Burke, M. A. and T. R. Sass (2013): “Classroom Peer Eects and Student Achievement,”
Journal of Labor Economics, 31, pp. 51–82.
Carneiro, P. and R. Ginja (2014): “Long-Term Impacts of Compensatory Preschool on
Health and Behavior: Evidence from Head Start,” American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 6, 135–173.
Carrasco, R. (2001): “Binary Choice with Binary Endogenous Regressors in Panel Data:
Estimating the Eect of Fertility on Female Labor Participation,” Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics, 19, 385–94.
133
Carrell, S. E., B. I. Sacerdote, and J. E.West (2011): “From Natural Variation to Optimal
Policy? The Lucas Critique Meets Peer Eects,” Working Paper 16865, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Carro, J. (2007a): “Estimating dynamic panel data discrete choice models with xed ef-
fects,” Journal of Econometrics, 140, 503–528.
Carro, J. M. (2007b): “Estimating dynamic panel data discrete choice models with xed
eects,” Journal of Econometrics, 140, 503–528.
Cascio, E. U. (2009): “Do Investments in Universal Early Education Pay O? Long-term
Eects of Introducing Kindergartens into Public Schools,” Working Paper 14951, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research.
Cascio, E. U. and D. W. Schanzenbach (2013): “The Impacts of Expanding Access to
High-Quality Preschool Education,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 127–178.
Chamberlain, G. (1984): “Panel Data, Handbook of Econometrics,” .
Charbonneau, K. (2012): “Multiple Fixed Eects in Nonlinear Panel Data Models,” Un-
published manuscript.
Chay, K. and D. Hyslop (2000): “Jackknife bias reduction for nonlinear dynamic panel
data models with xed eects,” .
Chen, M., I. Fernández-Val, and M. Weidner (2013): “Interactive Fixed Eects in Non-
linear Panel Data Models with Large N , T ,” .
Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, N. Hilger, E. Saez, D. W. Schanzenbach, and D. Yagan
(2011): “How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Aect Your Earnings? Evidence from
Project Star,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 1593–1660.
Cox, D. D. and T. Y. Kim (1995): “Moment bounds for mixing random variables useful
in nonparametric function estimation,” Stochastic processes and their applications, 56,
151–158.
Currie, J. (2001): “Early Childhood Education Programs,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
15, 213–238.
Currie, J. and D. Almond (2011): Human capital development before age ve, vol. 4, Part
B of Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
Das, J., S. Dercon, J. Habyarimana, P. Krishnan, K. Muralidharan, and V. Sun-
dararaman (2013): “School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test Scores,” American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5, 29–57.
134
Dearing, E., K. McCartney, and B. A. Taylor (2009): “Does Higher Quality Early Child
Care Promote Low-Income Children’s Math and Reading Achievement in Middle Child-
hood?” Child Development, 80, 1329–1349.
Dhaene, G. and K. Jochmans (2010): “Split-panel jackknife estimation of xed-eect
models,” .
——— (2014): “Split-panel jackknife estimation of xed-eect models,” .
——— (2015): “Split-panel jackknife estimation of xed-eect models,” The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 82, 991–1030.
Dhyne, E., C. Fuss, H. Pesaran, and P. Sevestre (2007): “Lumpy Price Adjustments, A
Microeconometric Analysis,” Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, 1–54.
Ding, W. and S. F. Lehrer (2007): “Do peers aect student achievement in China’s sec-
ondary schools?” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89, 300–312.
Epple, D. and R. E. Romano (2011): “Chapter 20 - Peer Eects in Education: A Survey of
the Theory and Evidence,” North-Holland, vol. 1 of Handbook of Social Economics, 1053
– 1163.
Fan, J. and Q. Yao (2003): “Nonlinear time series: nonparametric and parametric meth-
ods,” .
Felfe, C., N. Nollenberger, and N. Rodríguez-Planas (2015): “Can’t buy mommy’s
love? Universal childcare and children’s long-term cognitive development,” Journal of
Population Economics, 28, 393–422.
Fernández-Val, I. (2009): “Fixed eects estimation of structural parameters and marginal
eects in panel probit models,” Journal of Econometrics, 150, 71–85.
Fernández-Val, I. and J. Lee (2013): “Panel data models with nonadditive unobserved
heterogeneity: Estimation and inference,” Quantitative Economics, 4, 453–481.
Fernández-Val, I. and F. Vella (2011): “Bias corrections for two-step xed eects panel
data estimators,” Journal of Econometrics.
Fernandez-Val, I. and M. Weidner (2016): “Individual and Time Eects in Nonlienar
Panel Models with Large N, T,” Journal of Econometrics.
Fitzpatrick, M. (2008): “Starting School at Four: The Eect of Universal Pre-Kindergarten
on Children’s Academic Achievement,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
8, 1–40.
Fryer, R. G. (2011): “Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from Ran-
domized Trials,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 1755–1798.
135
——— (2013): “Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York
City Public Schools,” Journal of Labor Economics, 31, pp. 373–407.
Fu, C. and N. Mehta (forthcoming): “Ability Tracking, School and Parental Eort, and
Student Achievement: A Structural Model and Estimation,” Journal of Labor Economics.
Gagliardini, P. and C. Gourieroux (2014): “Eciency in large dynamic panel models
with common factor,” Econometric Theory, forthcoming.
Galvao, A. and K. Kato (2013): “Estimation and Inference for Linear Panel Data Models
under Misspecication when Both N and T are Large,” .
Gelber, A. and A. Isen (2013): “Children’s schooling and parents’ behavior: Evidence
from the Head Start Impact Study,” Journal of Public Economics, 101, 25 – 38.
Glewwe, P., N. Ilias, and M. Kremer (2010): “Teacher Incentives,” American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 2, 205–27.
Gormley Jr., W. T., T. Gayer, D. Phillips, and B. Dawson (2005): “The Eects of Uni-
versal Pre-K on Cognitive Development,” Developmental Psychology, 41, 872–884.
Gormley Jr., W. T. and D. Phillips (2005): “The Eects of Universal Pre-K in Oklahoma:
Research Highlights and Policy Implications,” Policy Studies Journal, 33, 65–82.
Gormley Jr., W. T., D. Phillips, S. Adelstein, and C. Shaw (2010): “Head Start’s Com-
parative Advantage: Myth or Reality?” Policy Studies Journal, 38, 397–418.
Greene, W. (2004): “The behavior of the xed eects estimator in nonlinear models,” The
Econometrics Journal, 7, 98–119.
Hahn, J. and G. Kuersteiner (2002): “Asymptotically Unbiased Inference for a Dynamic
Panel Model with Fixed Eects When Both n and T Are Large,” Econometrica, 70, 1639–
1657.
——— (2011): “Bias reduction for dynamic nonlinear panel models with xed eects,”
Econometric Theory, 1, 1–40.
Hahn, J. and H. Moon (2006): “Reducing bias of MLE in a dynamic panel model,” Econo-
metric Theory, 22, 499–512.
Hahn, J. and W. Newey (2004): “Jackknife and analytical bias reduction for nonlinear
panel models,” Econometrica, 72, 1295–1319.
Hansen, B. (1991): “Strong laws for dependent heterogeneous processes,” Econometric
Theory, 7, 213–221.
Hanushek, E. A., J. F. Kain, J. M. Markman, and S. G. Rivkin (2003): “Does peer ability
aect student achievement?” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18, 527–544.
136
Hausman, J., B. Hall, and Z. Griliches (1984): “Econometric Models for Count Data
with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship,” Econometrica, 52, 909–938.
Heckman, J. (1981): “The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial condi-
tions in estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process,” Structural analysis
of discrete data with econometric applications, 179–195.
Heckman, J. J. (2008): “Schools, Skills, and Synapses,” Economic Inquiry, 46, 289–324.
Heckman, J. J. and T. MaCurdy (1982): “Corrigendum on a Life Cycle Model of Female
Labour Supply,” Review of Economic Studies, 49, 659–60.
Heckman, J. J. and T. E. Macurdy (1980): “A Life Cycle Model of Female Labour Supply,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 47, pp. 47–74.
Helpman, E., M. Melitz, and Y. Rubinstein (2008): “Estimating Trade Flows: Trading
Partners and Trading Volumes,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 441–487.
Higham, N. J. (1992): “Estimating the matrix p-norm,” Numerische Mathematik, 62, 539–
555.
Horn, R. A. and C. R. Johnson (1985): Matrix analysis, Cambridge university press.
Houtenville, A. J. and K. S. Conway (2008): “Parental Eort, School Resources, and
Student Achievement,” The Journal of Human Resources, 43, 437–453.
Hu, L. (2002): “Estimation of a censored dynamic panel data model,” Econometrica, 70,
2499–2517.
Hyslop, D. R. (1999): “State Dependence, Serial Correlation and Heterogeneity in In-
tertemporal Labor Force Participation of Married Women,” Econometrica, 67, 1255–1294.
Inoue, A. and G. Solon (2010): “Two-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimators,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 92, 557–561.
Jenkins, J. M., G. Farkas, G. J. Duncan, M. Burchinal, and D. L. Vandell (2016): “Head
Start at Ages 3 and 4 Versus Head Start Followed by State Pre-K,” Educational Evaluation
and Policy Analysis, 38, 88–112.
Kato, K., A. Galvao, and G. Montes-Rojas (2012): “Asymptotics for panel quantile re-
gression models with individual eects,” Journal of Econometrics, 170, 76–91.
Ladd, H. F., C. G. Muschkin, and K. A. Dodge (2014): “From Birth to School: Early
Childhood Initiatives and Third-Grade Outcomes in North Carolina,” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 33, 162–187.
Lancaster, T. (2000): “The incidental parameter problem since 1948,” Journal of Econo-
metrics, 95, 391–413.
137
——— (2002): “Orthogonal parameters and panel data,” The Review of Economic Studies, 69,
647–666.
Li, T., L. Han, L. Zhang, and S. Rozelle (2014): “Encouraging classroom peer interac-
tions: Evidence from Chinese migrant schools,” Journal of Public Economics, 111, 29 –
45.
Lipsey, M. W., D. C. Farran, and K. G. Hofer (2015a): “A Randomized Control Trial
of a Statewide Voluntary Prekindergarten Program on Children’s Skills and Behaviors
through Third Grade,” Research report, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, Peabody
Research Institute.
Lipsey, M. W., C. Weiland, H. Yoshikawa, S. J. Wilson, and K. G. Hofer (2015b): “The
Prekindergarten Age-Cuto Regression-Discontinuity Design,” Educational Evaluation
and Policy Analysis, 37, 296–313.
Ludwig, J. and D. L. Miller (2007): “Does Head Start Improve Children’s Life Chances?
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
122, 159–208.
Magnuson, K. A., C. Ruhm, and J. Waldfogel (2007): “Does prekindergarten improve
school preparation and performance?” Economics of Education Review, 26, 33 – 51, the
Economics of Early Childhood Education.
Manski, C. F. (1993): “Identication of Endogenous Social Eects: The Reection Prob-
lem,” The Review of Economic Studies, 60, pp. 531–542.
McCrary, J. (2008): “Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test,” Journal of Econometrics, 142, 698 – 714, the regression disconti-
nuity design: Theory and applications.
McLeish, D. (1974): “Dependent central limit theorems and invariance principles,” the
Annals of Probability, 620–628.
——— (1975): “A maximal inequality and dependent strong laws,” The Annals of probability,
829–839.
Moffitt, R. A. and T. V. F. Comments (2000): “Policy Interventions, Low-Level Equilibria
And Social Interactions,” in Social Dynamics, MIT Press, 45–82.
Moon, H. and M. Weidner (2013a): “Dynamic Linear Panel Regression Models with In-
teractive Fixed Eects,” CeMMAP working paper series.
——— (2013b): “Linear Regression for Panel with Unknown Number of Factors as Interac-
tive Fixed Eects,” CeMMAP working paper series.
138
Muralidharan, K. and V. Sundararaman (2011): “Teacher Performance Pay: Experi-
mental Evidence from India,” Journal of Political Economy, 119, pp. 39–77.
Neidell, M. and J. Waldfogel (2010): “Cognitive and Noncognitive Peer Eects in Early
Education,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92, 562–576.
Neyman, J. and E. Scott (1948): “Consistent estimates based on partially consistent ob-
servations,” Econometrica, 16, 1–32.
Nickell, S. J. (1981): “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Eects,” Econometrica, 49,
1417–26.
Noboa-Hidalgo, G. E. and S. S. Urzua (2012): “The Eects of Participation in Public
Child Care Centers: Evidence from Chile,” Journal of Human Capital, 6, 1–34.
OECD (2017): Building an InclusiveMexico: Policies and Good Governance for Gender Equal-
ity, OECD Publishing.
Okui, R. (2013): “Asymptotically unbiased estimation of autocovariances and autocorre-
lations with panel data in the presence of individual and time eects,” Journal of Time
Series Econometrics, 1–53.
Olsen, R. (1978): “Note on the uniqueness of the maximum likelihood estimator for the
Tobit model,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1211–1215.
Pace, L. and A. Salvan (2006): “Adjustments of the prole likelihood from a new per-
spective,” Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 136, 3554–3564.
Park, J. Y. and P. C. B. Phillips (2000): “Nonstationary Binary Choice,” Econometrica, 68,
1249–1280.
Pesaran, M. H. (2006): “Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with a
multifactor error structure,” Econometrica, 74, 967–1012.
Phillips, P. C. B. andH.Moon (1999): “Linear Regression Limit Theory for Nonstationary
Panel Data,” Econometrica, 67, 1057–1111.
Pratt, J. (1981): “Concavity of the log likelihood,” Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation, 103–106.
Rasch, G. (1960): Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests, Studies
in mathematical psychology, Danmarks Paedagogiske Institut.
Reynolds, A. J., J. A. Temple, S.-R. Ou, I. A. Arteaga, and B. A. B.White (2011): “School-
Based Early Childhood Education and Age-28 Well-Being: Eects by Timing, Dosage,
and Subgroups,” Science, 333, 360–364.
139
Sacerdote, B. (2011): “Chapter 4 - Peer Eects in Education: How Might They Work, How
Big Are They and How Much Do We Know Thus Far?” Elsevier, vol. 3 of Handbook of
the Economics of Education, 249 – 277.
Stinebrickner, R. and T. R. Stinebrickner (2006): “What can be learned about peer
eects using college roommates? Evidence from new survey data and students from
disadvantaged backgrounds,” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1435 – 1454.
White, H. (2001): Asymptotic theory for econometricians, Academic press New York.
Woutersen, T. (2002): “Robustness against incidental parameters,” Unpublished
manuscript.
CURRICULUM VITAE
141
